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Abstract 
 
Throughout the forty-year conflict over the Western Sahara, the United States has 
supported Morocco’s occupation of the disputed territory. This overall policy has remained 
relatively consistent over time, yet constantly subjected to contestation. The debates over 
policy and various modes of exercising American power in this North African region have 
shifted over time as the structure of global politics changed. My research is guided by two 
interwoven questions: (1) How did the discourses on the Western Sahara conflict produced 
by U.S. policymakers change or remain consistent with shifts in the perceived imperatives of 
foreign policymaking from the Cold War to the War on Terror? And, (2) what do these 
discourses reveal about the state and the process of statemaking? My project is to explore 
how the Western Sahara has been scripted as a place of insecurity in the geopolitical 
imaginations of U.S. foreign policymakers and what this process can reveal about the nature 
of the state.  
I examine the practices of representation, with a particular focus on discourses of 
security, which have situated the Western Sahara conflict in the imaginary geographies of 
U.S. policymakers. I trace the reformulations and reiterations of these discourses across 
historical shifts in international politics. Through close examination of the discourses of 
foreign policymakers recorded in official texts, I explore continuities, ruptures and 
contestations of representations of the conflict and their impact on policy decisions. My 
research specifically focuses on the language used by congressmen, State Department 
officials and presidents, seen in the texts of congressional hearings and other government 
documents. I argue that historical moments of opportunity to resolve the conflict were 
foreclosed by the discourses of security and the imperial practices of American statecraft. I 
conclude that understanding these discourses as part of a performative process of statecraft 
helps to reveal the vulnerability of the imperial state, and to make possible interventions into 
the discourses to produce real change and a just resolution to this conflict.  
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Preface 
The way that we narrate places, peoples and events situate them within preexisting 
norms of intelligibility that limit possibilities for political understanding and action. When I 
first began to read about the Western Sahara in the summer of 2012, I was struck by the 
incongruity among various narratives and frameworks for understanding the forty-year 
conflict over the territory. How was it possible, I wondered, that observers could disagree so 
fundamentally over the narratives of what had happened in this large swath of territory 
contested between the state of Morocco and the Sahrawi independence movement? What 
material effect did these interpretations have on the ongoing conflict and the lives of people 
living in this region? The various lenses imposed on the Western Sahara region restricted 
interpretations of its history and constrained possibilities for political action with respect to 
the region.  I am concerned that the modes of seeing and representing the Western Sahara 
that have circulated in the discourses of United States policymakers have erased and 
obscured the experiences and desires of the Sahrawi people, and have instead produced the 
conditions of possibility for increased U.S. influence and control over the broader North 
African region.  
In the fall of 2012, while studying in Rabat, Morocco, I travelled to the Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara territory to interview self-identified human rights defenders. I 
arrived just after the two-year anniversary of the infamous and contested events of a 
demonstration known as Gdeim Izik, intending to evaluate the challenges facing nonviolent 
civil society resistance against the Moroccan occupation. In November 2010, a large-scale 
peaceful encampment that been built by Sahrawi protestors outside of the city of Laayoune 
was violently dismantled by Moroccan security forces, resulting in destructive riots in the 
administrative capital, Laayoune. I was drawn to investigate the conflicting narratives of 
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these events when I read that Noam Chomsky had alluded to the Sahrawi protests at Gdeim 
Izik as the beginning of the Arab Spring.1 Inspired by the movements for political change 
that had spread across the Arab world in the spring of 2011, and troubled by their violent 
repression, I was interested in understanding the possibilities for, and challenges of, 
sustaining nonviolent social movements. My research concluded that, despite the fact that 
knowledge of the Gdeim Izik encampment and its aftermath was too well restricted by the 
Moroccan media embargo to have directly inspired the later revolutions in Tunisia and 
Egypt, the strategies, demands, and challenges endured by the Sahrawi protestors bore 
similarities with other contemporary attempts at nonviolent revolution and reform.   
The process of researching, travelling, interviewing and writing about these events 
drew my attention to the deep importance of the politics of representing the conflict. In my 
report, which focused on the role of media and representations of violence during the events 
of Gdeim Izik, I included a note of introduction to acknowledge the complex role that 
conflicting language plays in polarizing the narratives and interpretations of the conflict. In a 
sense, this thesis project is an expansion of that note. At the time I was concerned with the 
contested use of specific words such as ‘occupation’ or ‘annexation.’2 This interest in the 
political impact of language in the ongoing Western Sahara conflict translated into a theoretical 
exploration of the politics of representation and the performativity of language that has 
informed my thesis project. I am concerned with how the language of foreign policy, and its 
accompanying discourses of security, identity and power, enables a view of the world that 
                                                
1 Chomsky, Noam. “The Genie is out of the Bottle: Assessing a Changing Arab World with Noam Chomsky 
and Al Jazeera’s Marwan Bishara.” Democracy Now. February 17, 2011. Accessed: September 20, 2012. 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/17/the_genies_are_out_of_the 
2 The note was initially intended to assert the impossibility of neutrality, and to justify my use of specific terms. 
Despite this frankness, the Moroccan professors to whom I presented my work accused me of bias. To this, I 
would add, the language I use to write about this conflict is cannot be neutral. It circulates certain discourses of 
power and privileges some narratives over others. Bias, if that is what some choose to call it, is inevitable, and 
denial of this is a disavowal of one’s own political subjectivity.     
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propagates violence and the disenfranchisement of marginalized peoples. I am drawn to 
thinking about the performative power of discourse, the ways of seeing and understanding that 
are excluded and foreclosed by certain discourses, and the possibilities for intervention and 
change. 
Before delving further, I must first give a brief overview of the major historical events 
of the conflict over the Western Sahara, if only to provide broad strokes of reference for 
readers who may be unfamiliar with the narratives of this region. 3 The conflict over the 
Western Sahara originated from an interrupted process of decolonization that deviated from 
the pattern of contemporary processes of decolonization that had taken place in most parts of 
Africa.4  The territory was colonized by Spain in 1884, and remained a Spanish colony when 
the modern nation-state of Morocco became independent in 1956.5 In 1973, the rebel group 
Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, known as the Polisario Front, 
was founded as one of several factions fighting for independence from Spain. The United 
Nations began planning for a referendum vote to give the inhabitants of the region the right to 
exercise self-determination, and Spain conducted a population census for that purpose in 1974.  
Morocco petitioned the International Court of Justice for a legal decision regarding Morocco’s 
claim to the territory. The 1975 ICJ opinion held that Morocco did not have a historical claim 
to the territory prior to Spanish colonization, and advocated a process of self-determination.6 
                                                
3 For comprehensive histories of the region see: Zunes and Mundy (2010), Shelley (2004), Jensen (2005), 
Pazzanita and Hodges (1994), and Hodges (1983). 
4 Munene, Macharia. “Multiple Colonialism in Western Sahara.” Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship 
in Africa. Vol.2, No.2 (2010):1-18 
5 As part of a narrative of nation-building after independence, Moroccan King Mohammed V asserted a 
historical claim to this region (as well as parts of Mauritania, Algeria, Mali and Senegal) as part of an idea of 
“Greater Morocco.” The regions of Sidi Ifni and Tarfaya in Southern Morocco were incorporated into the 
modern nation state, while this expansionism provoked a bitter war between Morocco and Algeria in the 1960s. 
The legacy of this war still lingers in the tense relationship between Morocco and Algeria that plays out over 
the Western Sahara territory.   
6 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, (1975) 
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In response, however, King Hassan II immediately declared his intention to reclaim the Sahara 
as part of the Moroccan nation-state.  
 In an event known as the Green March, the Moroccan government mobilized 350,000 
Moroccans to march, unarmed and waving Moroccan flags and Qurans, into the Spanish 
Sahara on November 6th, 1975.  In Morocco, this event is celebrated as a moment of national 
unity and a reunion with their “Saharan brothers.” For dissident Sahrawi communities, this 
event accompanied an invasion which initiated the war between Morocco and the Polisario.7 
The war lasted until the UN brokered a cease-fire in 1991, and resulted in the exile of half of 
the Sahrawi population to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The conflict has been at a 
stalemate for the last twenty years, while the UN peacekeeping mission, known as MINURSO, 
has failed to implement the promised referendum vote for the Sahrawi people to choose 
between independence, autonomy or integration with Morocco. Throughout this period, a 
Moroccan system of economic incentives has lured residents from Morocco proper to settle in 
the eighty-five percent of the territory that they currently control. Debates continue over who 
is eligible to vote in the proposed referendum; Morocco continues to move people into the 
territory while Polisario clings to the 1974 census participants and their descendents as the 
only rightful voters. Accusations of human rights abuses are thrown at both sides, yet 
MINURSO lacks the power to monitor and prosecute human rights violations.  Despite the 
long-standing political impasse, recent years have seen increasing unrest and vibrant civil 
society resistance from within the occupied territory.   
                                                
7 The Polisario also fought against Mauritanian claims to the territory in the initial stages of the conflict, but a 
peace deal was signed with Mauritania in 1979. 
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The United States has played an active role behind the scenes throughout the duration 
of this conflict. 8 U.S. officials were involved in and aware of Morocco’s plan to take the Sahara 
from Spain, and sold arms to Morocco throughout the Cold War, while simultaneously 
proclaiming their support for a process of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. In the 
1990s, the United States played an important role in the United Nations efforts to resolve the 
conflict, while continuing to support Morocco’s successful attempts to stall the peace process. 
The beginning of the War on Terror prompted new military and economic collaborations 
between the United States and Morocco. U.S. officials continue to express that policy towards 
the conflict has remained consistently neutral from administration to administration.9 While 
officially the U.S. supports the UN peace process to resolve the conflict through negotiation 
and a referendum for self-determination, the U.S., along with France, has strongly backed 
Morocco’s continued control over this territory in a variety of ways over time. Most observers 
consider political, economic and military interests to be the driving factors behind U.S. policy 
toward this conflict; as Teresa Whitfield notes, “realism won out.”10 However, U.S. policy 
towards this conflict has been shaped by far more complex processes of producing and 
circulating ideas of the national interest and the imperatives of policy. 
In what follows, I will look at debates among statemakers over policy toward the 
Western Sahara conflict in order to make sense of the nature of American power as it was 
constituted and debated in relation to changes in global politics. Understanding the changes 
                                                
8 For analyses of the role of the United States see: Zunes and Mundy (2010), Mundy (2007), Zunes (1987, 
1998), Zoubir (2009), Saidy (2011), and Wright (1983). 
9 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the 
Kingdom of Morocco.” November 22, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/22/joint-
statement-united-states-america-and-kingdom-morocco  
10 “In the stark juxtaposition of international law and political realism that Western Sahara represents—and 
East Timor represented until 1999—realism won out, with the interests pursued by the Friends a central driver 
in a process that was not able to move beyond the zero-sum options pursued by the parties.”  
Whitfield, Teresa. Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict. (US Institute of 
Peace Press, 2007): 189. 
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and continuities in policymaking over these historical-political shifts requires looking past 
labels such as realist or liberal in order to see how state discourses and practices of 
representation produce specific policy imperatives and performances of state power. The 
theoretical orientation introduced in the following chapter will guide my analysis of the foreign 
policy practices that have enabled the current status quo policy toward the Western Sahara. My 
intention is to understand how we arrived at this political moment, and what ways of thinking 
need to be questioned and subverted in order to produce real change and a just solution to this 
conflict.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The discourses of statemaking have scripted the conflict over the Western Sahara 
into the geopolitical imaginations of U.S. foreign policymakers.11 Policymakers in the United 
States represented and located this conflict within contemporaneous regional and global 
geopolitical landscapes. Thinking about the changes in these international political 
landscapes over time reveals moments in which the official narrative on this region could 
have advanced a just resolution to the conflict, and the ways that the discourses were 
reconstituted to foreclose real political change. The ongoing struggle over the Western 
Sahara territory has spanned the transition in global politics from a Cold War era predicated 
on bipolarity and balancing of power to an era of American global hegemony in the context 
of the Global War on Terror. In this context, examining United States policy towards the 
Western Sahara conflict is a useful means to explore the ways that the practices of 
statemakers imagined, produced and debated the nature of state power and the relationship 
between the U.S. and the world.  
My research explores how narratives of the Western Sahara conflict, in the discourse 
of officials in the United States, has evolved over time, and what this story can illuminate 
about changes and consistencies in the practices of U.S. statemaking. Two interwoven 
questions guide my research; first, how did the discourses on the Western Sahara conflict produced by 
U.S. policymakers change or remain consistent with shifts in the perceived imperatives of foreign policymaking 
from the Cold War to the War on Terror? And, second, what do these discourses reveal about the nature 
of the state and the process of statemaking?  I trace the evolution of the narrative on the Western 
                                                
11 In this text, I use the term “Western Sahara” in a few different ways.  Geographically, my usage of the term 
“Western Sahara” refers to the land formerly known as Spanish Sahara now claimed in its entirety by the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. (See Appendix for maps). I use the modifiers “Moroccan-occupied” or 
“Moroccan-controlled” to refer to the approximately 85% of this territory which is currently administered by 
Morocco.  I also use the term “Western Sahara” to refer more generally to the conflict over this land.  
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Sahara and the framing of, and the tension between, the interests and principles perceived to 
be at stake. I look at statements of policy and human rights reports produced by the State 
Department, debates in congressional hearings, and presidential statements on foreign 
policy. My research focuses on textual analysis of U.S. government documents in order to 
understand the process of decision-making with respect to this conflict. My attention is to 
the ways that ideas about national security and interests were constituted and employed in 
representations of this conflict.  
Running through my investigation is an exploration of the role of representation and 
discourse in the process of statemaking. I attempt to unpack the discursive practices that 
produce and perform the state, and the relationship between foreign policymaking and 
statemaking. My chapters analyze the practices of representation used to promote, explain 
and justify the policies of the United States towards the conflict in the Western Sahara, with 
attention to the elements of continuity and discontinuity that reveal changing ideas and 
realities of state power and statecraft. Language plays an important role in these processes, 
not only as a tool for justifying policy decisions, but also as a means of knowledge and 
power production. I am concerned with how material practices of U.S. policy were 
influenced by the inscription of particular narratives of security and interest onto this 
conflict and the broader region.  
Central to my analysis is a discursive approach to thinking about power and an 
orientation towards understanding the state as a performative process, rather than as a 
unitary actor. I am concerned with the imperial undertones of the process of scripting places 
according to perceived interests and principles of the state, and disturbed by the effects of 
material and discursive practices of securitization on human lives.  
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While traditional writings on international relations engage in debates on the 
governing logic of states, they begin from incomplete assumptions about the nature of 
power, its relationship to territory, and the concept of the sovereign state. A realist 
orientation views states as unitary actors governed by interests, who are sovereign over a 
delimited area of territory from which they project power in a global political system made 
up of other state actors. This orientation leads policymakers to follow perceived policy 
imperatives without questioning how the interests of the state are constituted and which 
foreclose thinking about the exercise of power outside of the framework of the state. It is an 
orientation fundamentally biased against the interests, needs and desires of marginalized 
(non-state) groups such as the Sahrawi community, and which presumes that the state is the 
only legitimate political actor. Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, give credence to 
supranational powers and institutions; yet take for granted the definitions of national interest 
and security that are produced by discourses of the state. The debates over policy that I 
examine with respect to the Western Sahara are shaped by the contestations between liberals 
and realists over the best way to pursue national interests and principles. However, what 
must be further interrogated are the discourses that produce the boundaries of the state, its 
perceptions of interest, and the performance of state power in the international realm.    
The end of the Cold War and the launch of the Global War on Terror are generally 
understood as major turning points that required the questioning, reformulating, and 
reasserting of the role of the United States in a changing global political order.12 Realist 
neoconservatives, such as Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, predicted the “end of 
                                                
12 From a U.S.-centric perspective, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror are often 
seen to mark epochal changes in world history. I do not mean to suggest that I view the fall of the Berlin Wall 
or the events of September 11, 2001 as singular events that marked fundamental ruptures in human history. 
Rather, my intention is to trace the modes of thinking that carry over across this perceived ruptures and the 
ways that they were reconceived. The linear bracketing of world history often disguises the ways that histories 
overlap and obscure the pasts that are still with us.  
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history” and a coming “clash of civilizations.”13 They, and many members of the Bush 
administration welcomed the new unilateral hegemony of the United States and sought to 
preserve its unilateral dominance. Liberal internationalists, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
many in the Clinton administration, saw the international political order as increasingly 
dependent on collective security and multi-lateral cooperation, albeit still lead by the 
indispensable United States.14 Realists and liberals clashed in their attempts to define the new 
interests and principles at stake for the United States, but the consensus was that fundamental 
change had occurred and that the U.S. must strive to maintain its global power. Skeptics, such 
as historian Andrew Bacevich, later asserted that the rhetoric of freedom and change disguised 
the fact that there was a “coherent grand strategy conceived many decades earlier and now 
adapted to the circumstances of the post-cold war era.”15 Bacevich saw continuity in American 
foreign policy across shifts in the global geopolitics. In American Empire, he identifies the 
purpose of U.S. foreign policy to preserve and expand an American empire through a 
commitment to global openness in a world shaped by American democratic capitalism with 
the United States as the “ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.”16 Tracing these 
debates in the context of discussions over the Western Sahara conflict will help to reveal the 
ways that foreign policy norms, constituted as imperatives of order, stability and security, were 
implemented and contested across these transitions.  
My research traces changes and consistencies over time in order to understand how 
the narratives and discourses on the Western Sahara changed from the Cold War, to the post-
war optimism of the 1990s to the current era of the ‘War on Terror.’ The early 1990s saw a 
                                                
13 See: Fukuyama, Francis and Allan Bloom. The End of History?. Vol. 16 National Affairs, Incorporated, 1989. 
 and Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23. (Summer 1993): 23-49. 
14 Slaughter, Anne-Marie. The Idea that is America: Keeping Faith with our Values in a Dangerous World Basic Books, 
2008. 
15 Bacevich, Andrew J. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002): 3. 
16 Bacevich, 3. 
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burst of scholarship seeking to imagine what the new political order would look like. Debates 
between various international relations schools of thought presented predictions and 
proscriptions for new ways to order global politics and new priorities for U.S. policy. 
However, this period also produced a growth of critical literature that sought to unpack 
traditional forms of speaking and writing about global politics and foreign policy. Working 
from a perspective inspired by the post-structuralist and post-modern work of Foucault, 
Derrida and others, critical political scientists and geographers began to focus attention on the 
role of discourse in producing political realities.  Scholars in a variety of disciplines were 
concerned with the process of speaking and writing about politics to produce particular forms 
of power and knowledge, to the exclusion of others. 
A Foucauldian approach to power calls on us to think of power as relational, which 
produces and is produced by discourses that claim to be truth. As such, “we are subjected to 
the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth.”17 Neither the state nor foreign policymakers possess power in 
themselves, but instead exercise power through the production of truths. The narratives that 
they tell about the United States and about other places and peoples claim to be truths, yet are 
shaped by the dominance of statist discourses of security and sovereignty, and the subjugation 
of local discourses of rights and freedoms. Foucault sought to direct our analyses of power 
away from the centralized, unitary state, to the practices of subjugation taking place in the 
margins. The Western Sahara, as it has been conceived by U.S. statemakers, is such a place. 
The practices of occupation by the Moroccan state, aided and abetted by the United States, 
occlude and subjugate local knowledges, ways of beings, identities, and the political capacity of 
the Saharawi people. A place and a people relegated to the periphery of hegemonic U.S. 
                                                
17 Foucault, Michel and Colin Gordon. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. 
(American ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): 93. 
16 
power, Western Sahara is a site of the exercise of violent, subjugating, and disciplining 
relations of power.   
This thesis project focuses on the role of discursive power and practices of 
representation in producing, legitimizing and maintaining violent, statist and reductionist 
policies and ways of thinking. I begin from political scientist Roxanne Doty’s assertion that 
“The goal of analyzing is not to reveal previously obscured truths, but to examine how 
representations underlie the production of knowledge/identities and make certain courses of 
action possible.”18 Following Doty’s directive to interrogate how certain discourses made 
particular policies or courses of action possible, I focus on how the broader narratives of the 
U.S. relationship to the world shifted from the era of the Cold War and the War on Terror and 
how those narratives impacted representations of the Western Sahara conflict in U.S. policy 
circles. The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror are generally 
understood as moments when the structure of global politics underwent fundamental shifts.  
However, it is important to see these shifts as occurring at the level of the discursive and the 
performative, rather than take for granted the ‘truths’ about global politics that they represent. 
Doty writes that, “International politics are inextricably bound up with discursive practices 
that put into circulation representations taken as ‘truth.’”  Such ‘truths’ bear interrogating, in 
particular those discourses that perpetuate violence through assumptions about state power 
and security.  
Writing in 1990, political scientist Michael Shapiro defines discourse as a “linguistic 
practice that puts into play a set of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers 
                                                
18 Doty, Roxanne Lynn. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996): 5.  
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and themes.”19 Specific discourses shape and delimit the conditions of intelligibility through 
which we understand people, places and events in the world.  Along these lines, Roxanne 
Doty’s work is concerned with the way that discursive practices “highlight the arbitrary, 
constructed and political nature of the binary oppositions through which we have come to 
“know’ the world and justify certain practices and policies.”20 This strain of thought sees the 
rhetoric of foreign policy as part of a larger discursive economy through which global power 
and authority are exercised. I am concerned with the power exercised by the use of particular 
terms, concepts, and ways of framing issues. To this end, I understand discourse as embodied 
sets of practices of representation, not simply linguistic exchange or debate. 
The process of representing the Western Sahara conflict through the discourse of 
foreign policymaking imposed particular meanings and imaginations of the place and the 
people, and the relationship to Morocco and to the broader region. Drawing on Michael 
Shapiro’s understanding of representation as a practice through which things take on meaning 
and value, I interrogate the practices of representation that acquire discursive power in 
thinking about the Western Sahara. Central to this discursive process of representation is the 
practice of engraining a binary of us (the nation-state of the U.S.) versus them (the Sahrawi 
other) by locating (in)security in places defined by their otherness.  In this formulation, 
Morocco is identified as other, yet friendly, and is conscripted into the practices of 
securitization by the United States. The Western Sahara has consistently been scripted as a site 
of insecurity despite shifts and reformulations of the security discourses that governed the 
political eras of the Cold War, post-Cold War and the War on Terror. 
                                                
19 Shapiro, Michael. "Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the 
Video Age." International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in 
International Studies (Sep., 1990): 330. 
20 Doty, 3. 
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Central to my exploration of the discourses of statemaking in relation to the Western 
Sahara conflict is an orientation towards a theoretical lens employed by scholars of critical 
geopolitics. Critical geopolitics seeks to critique the imperial and colonial roots of conventional 
geopolitics, which is concerned with the spatialization of power across territories, in order to 
think new relationships between geography and international politics.21 Critical geopolitics 
scholars, such as Gearoid O’Tuathail, David Campbell, John Agnew, and Derek Gregory, seek 
to fundamentally question and deconstruct hegemonic geopolitical discourses of power, space, 
and identity.22 This approach is concerned with how places are scripted into the imaginative 
geographies23 of the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ by discourses of power and security.24  
Urban theorist Michael Sorkin traces the genealogy of the concept ‘imaginative 
geographies’ as a term that “denotes the ways in which imperialist societies tend to be 
constructed through normalizing binary judgments about both foreign and colonized 
territories and the home spaces which sit at the heart of empire.”25 The constitution of the 
nation-state of the United States depends on a process of determining the conditions of 
exclusion and inclusion within the nation in response to spaces defined as other and 
threatening. The Western Sahara is inscribed by the geopolitical gaze of policymakers as a 
external place of insecurity that must be secured. As used by critical geographer Gearoid 
O’Tuathail, the ‘geopolitical gaze’ is always possessive, and reinforces imperial, hierarchical, 
                                                
21 “The study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and 
hegemonic states.” Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Vol. 6 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996): 60.  
22 See Tuathail (1996), Campbell (1992), Agnew (1994), and Gregory (1995) for example.  
23 For Gregory, Edward Said’s term ‘imaginative geographies’ refers to a process of folding distance into 
difference through a series of spatializations. He understands this as fabrication, noting that the concept 
“usefully combines something fictionalized and something made real because they are imaginations given 
substance.” Gregory, Derek. The Colonial Present. (Malden: MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 17.  
24 O’Tuathail refers to the intellectuals of statecraft as those statesmen, politicians and military commanders 
who concern themselves with the everyday conduct of foreign policy.  
25 Sorkin, Michael. Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Security State. (London: Routledge, 2013):1. 
Sorkin traces the concept of ‘imaginative geographies’ from Michel Foucault, to Edward Said, to critical 
geographer Derek Gregory. I revisit to the idea of ‘home spaces’ and the homeland in chapter four, drawing on 
the work of Amy Kaplan.  
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and violent relations of power. The geopolitical gaze of U.S. policymakers sights (sees) and 
sites (locates) the Western Sahara according to prevailing discourses of truth. The geopolitical 
gaze and its practices of representation securitize regions and peoples in order to produce and 
enable imperial modes of exercising state power.  
By security discourse, I refer to the use of rhetoric that represents places, identities and 
conflicts as dangerous and threatening to the nation-state. Following the theoretical framework 
of political scientist David Campbell, I understand discourses of security to be boundary-
producing processes that locate danger in places that are characterized as foreign. This process 
of defining the state through discourses of danger and difference delimits the boundaries of 
the state’s identity. 26 The state, and the leaders and officials who act for the state, understands 
it’s self in relation to external others characterized as dangerous. The discourses of the state 
define who is to be included and protected, and who is to be feared and defended against. 
Foreign policy, as an integral practice of statemaking, depends on a process of identifying what 
is external to the state and designating it as dangerous. Investigating the discursive process of 
producing the Western Sahara as a location of external insecurity and potential danger located 
in the periphery requires a process of gaining insight into our understanding of the ‘self’ of the 
American State.  
The classic Weberian definition understands the state as an institution with a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a fixed territory.  Political scientist Timothy 
Mitchell criticizes statist scholars such as Theda Skocpol for their narrow understanding of the 
state as actors who make policy decisions independent from society.27 Mitchell’s understanding 
                                                
26 Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1992). Campbell’s work focuses on the theme, “that the boundaries of a state’s identity are 
secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy.” (3). 
27 Mitchell, Timothy. “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics.” The American 
Political Science Review. Mar 1991; Vol. 85, No. 1: 77-96.  
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of the state seeks to complicate the boundary between the state and society by focusing on this 
boundary as a process. My work will attempt to understand the state as a performative process 
of statecraft, whereby a wide range of actors constantly negotiate and perform the meanings 
and power of the state’s identity and actions. I use the term ‘statecraft’ in Roxanne Doty’s 
sense of the “never finally completed project of working to fix meaning, authority, and 
control.”28 As a process, statecraft relies on the relentlessly continuous production of 
discourses of security and power. According to Campbell, “The paradox inherent to their 
being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from 
the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in 
a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its 
lack of prediscursive foundations: stasis would be death.”29 While the discourses of the U.S. 
state must constantly produce its identity, it is important to understand this process as one that 
requires the securing of interests deemed necessary for the identity of the state. The Western 
Sahara is one of the many locations where the power of the U.S. state is performed through 
practices of securing interests directly or through proxy states, economic policy, or diplomacy. 
These practices have changed over time to suit changing political landscapes, as I will explore 
in subsequent chapters.   
The state is neither a unified nor a centralized institution, though it may present itself 
as such. Rather, it is made up of a variety of state actors from elected leaders, officials, 
theorist-practitioners and sympathetic media.30 In this text, I use the general term 
‘policymakers’ to refer to elected representatives and state officials. The consistent use of this 
term is meant to emphasize the constructed and performative nature of the state, and its 
                                                
28 Doty, 177. 
29 Campbell, 11. 
30 The scope of this project limits me to looking at the discourse of state officials, though I recognize a broader 
range of actors that function as agents of the state. 
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multifaceted components.31 The policymakers in the State Department and Congress whose 
language I will examine are not autonomous state actors producing political realities through 
discourse, but are themselves subject to and constituted by the discourses of state-making. 
With respect to the Western Sahara conflict, debates over policy relied upon 
commonly accepted ideas about power and its exercise over the space of territorial states.  As 
the conditions of global politics changed, through the end of the Cold War, the emergence of 
the War on Terror, the spread of globalization and policies of liberalization, these ideas were 
tested, reconfigured, changed, and reclaimed. The narratives, lenses and political orientations 
that shaped the ways U.S. policymakers saw the Western Sahara changed over time with 
prevailing assumptions about the nature of global political imperatives. The Western Sahara 
case is helpful for understanding how exertions of power have changed; been deterritorialized, 
decentralized, and become more dependent on economic, cultural and discursive processes.  
The Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara in many ways resembles patterns of 
European colonialism in the region. As a post-colonial state, Morocco relied upon its claims to 
the Saharan territory as a central piece of its performance as a modern nation-state. The war 
over the Sahara was initiated to rally support for the King and to unify the nation as a political 
state. The idea that the Sahara is, has been and will always be Moroccan is central to modern 
Moroccan nationalism, and carries as much power now as it did in 1975. So while this work is 
focused on understanding how the U.S. supports Morocco’s control over the Sahara in order 
to serve its interests of state, we cannot overlook how Morocco makes use of this to further its 
                                                
31 I attempt to avoid reducing the state to a unitary and undifferentiated actor, though at times my use the term 
‘United States’ may read as reductionist. I too am subject to the dominant discourse of the state, and for the 
sake of expediency I occasionally fall into this trap. I intend this text to be read with attention to the specificity 
of these terms and their complex meanings and uses, even when I fail to articulate these differentiations.  
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own interests of state.32 Modern practices of exerting power over territory outside the bounds 
of the nation, often termed neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism, are seen in the U.S.’s subtle 
and indirect support for the securing of the Sahara.33 The legacies of colonialism and its 
modern iterations shape the possibilities, desires, and imaginations of the peoples in this 
region. Morocco’s assertion of sovereignty over the Sahara is part of practices of expansion 
and of determining what is included and excluded in the nation-state.34 The legacies of 
colonialism have also trapped the Sahrawi population in a discourse of self-determination that 
follows a pattern of Eurocentric norms of state sovereignty and identity that exclude their 
previous nomadic and borderless modes of life. 
                                                
32 This is seen in the Moroccan government’s highly successful investment in lobbying firms in Washington 
who advocate for its interests and help to shape the narratives of Congressmen that will be examined here. 
33 The meanings and relationships between the words imperialism, neo-imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, and hegemony need to be further investigated. As understood by Robert Young in his definitive 
text on postcolonialism, imperialism differs from colonialism in that it is driven by a strategy of state expansion 
while colonialism develops haphazardly as a practice rather than as policy. According to Young, imperialism is 
“characterized by the exercise of power either through direct conquest or (latterly) through political and 
economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination…Typically, it is the deliberate 
product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and extends its control to the furthest reaches of the 
peripheries: think of the Pentagon and the CIA in Washington, with their global strategy of controlling events 
in independent states all over the world in order to defeat communism or Islamic resistance and further U.S. 
interests.” (Young, 27). John Agnew, on the other hand, seeks to replace the term empire with the concept of 
hegemony. He argues that in the context of globalization and the changing relationship between territory and 
power, hegemony is better suited to describe the new kind of power that is exerted by the United States.  
Each of these definitions leaves me unsatisfied, with avenues for further explorations beyond this thesis 
project. While I agree with Agnew that the nature of power and its relationship to territory and space have 
changed, policymakers are still rooted in traditional conceptualizations of power that make sense with the use 
of the terms imperialism or neo-imperialism. Young writes, “Imperialism, on the other hand, operated from the 
centre as a policy of state, driven by the grandiose projects of power.” (Young, 17). However, unlike Young’s 
definition, the state is not a unitary actor and its relationship to ideology is far more complex to fully adopt his 
definition of imperialism. For lack of a simultaneously more specific and encompassing term at the moment, I 
chose to use both of the terms hegemony and neo-imperialism to describe the exercise of United States power 
beyond its boundaries, and I characterize the nature of this power as hegemonic and imperial in the text that 
follows. See: Young, Robert. J.C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). 
And: Agnew, John. Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). 
34 Revisionist legal scholar Antony Anghie argues that international legal principles developed out of the 
processes and legacies of colonialism. His thesis is that the Euro-centric doctrine of sovereignty developed as a 
principle of international law in relation to the colonial encounter. Important for the Western Sahara context is 
his argument that once ‘Third World countries’ gained European-style sovereignty through decolonization, they 
struggled to solidify sovereignty internally by assimilating and incorporating minorities as a practice of nation-
state-making. Anghie, Antony. Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law. Vol. 37. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
23 
The process of scripting the Western Sahara conflict through the discourses of foreign 
policymaking is directly dependent on the marginalization and occlusion of alternative 
narratives and interpretations.  Attention to what is not said or not highlighted in the discourse 
of policymakers is as revealing as the words and frameworks they do use to discuss the region.  
My project identifies and analyzes how these exclusions and ways of thinking have enabled 
certain modes of policy towards the region, and what this process reveals about the nature of 
the state. In his work, Critique of Security, Mark Neocleous asserts that his project is to “open up 
the analysis to the ways in which spaces and places, processes and categories, are imagined 
through the lens of insecurity and in turn appropriated and colonized by the project of 
security.”35 Along similar lines, this thesis analyzes the specific language that was and is used to 
imagine the Western Sahara as a site of insecurity, and discusses how this imagination enables 
the imperial practices of securitization that the United States is currently undertaking in the 
Sahara region. I refer specifically to the upsurge of U.S. military involvement in the Sahara 
over the last decade through programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
and AFRICOM.     
In sum, the theoretical framework guiding my research is predicated on thinking 
explicitly about representational lenses and modes of seeing the Western Sahara conflict 
through the eyes of policymakers in the United States. As scholars of performing security 
suggest, looking at practices of representation and imaginative geographies is not simply about 
language as it constructs and describes ideas, but about the power and knowledge produced by 
the performativity of discourse.36 In other words, discourse is not a tool that subjects use to 
describe political ideas, but in fact constitutes and makes possible political realities and 
                                                
35 Neocleous, Mark. Critique of Security. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008): 3. 
36 Bialasiewicz, Luisa and David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison Williams. 
“Performing Security: The imaginative geographies of current U.S. strategy.” Political Geography Vol. 26. (2007): 
405-422.  
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subjects. The discourse and policies of state actors in the United States helped to produce the 
Western Sahara’s territory, history, and people, while simultaneously producing and defining 
the identity of the United States. The lens of performativity helps to understand these 
discourses as productive of the material effects that they name.37  
The language that policymakers used to describe, debate and justify policy is important 
not just as a veneer that may disguise underlying intentions and meanings, but as a tool of 
shaping what was possible or logical to think. This process was undertaken both consciously 
and subconsciously. Shapiro notes that, “To maintain the credibility of its strategic discourse, 
the American state must therefore manage the articulation and expression of policy.”38 Policy 
makers were acutely aware of the power of their words.  Upon entering office in 1989, 
Secretary of State James Baker noted, “I wanted to make sure I controlled policy, and at State, 
that meant controlling words.”39 Baker, who presided over several important moments in the 
history of the Western Sahara conflict, was highly conscious of the power of language in 
statemaking. The discourses of policymakers exerted their power over this conflict region 
through its control over the conditions of intelligibility and possibilities for policy. It is with 
this orientation in mind that I read the texts of U.S. foreign policymakers speaking and writing 
on the Western Sahara conflict.  
In the United States, making foreign policy decisions is a multilevel, multilayered 
process undertaken in numerous ways by a variety of actors. While the discourses of statecraft 
are produced by a range of official, elected, academic and media voices, I focus primarily on 
official statements in the public record by congressmen, State Department officials, and 
                                                
37 See: Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is life grievable? (New York: Verso, 2009): 168.  
Butler’s concept of the performative requires constant iteration for performative effects to become part of the 
process of materialization. The state is relentlessly iterated through the performances of discourses of power.   
38 Shapiro (1990), 334. 
39 Baker, James Addison and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-
1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995): 33. 
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presidents. Drawing from close readings of statements and debates over U.S. policy towards 
the Western Sahara and foreign policy more generally, I look at the language of policymakers 
to understand how central discourses of interests, power, security, sovereignty and self-
determination were constituted, intersected, changed and contested.  
My chapters are structured chronologically to trace the development of the narratives 
on the Western Sahara conflict over time. I identify tensions between conflicting 
representations and seek to understand how certain discourses on the region became 
dominant, to the exclusion of others. I will argue that as the global political landscape changed, 
there were moments of opportunity for the narrative on the Western Sahara to be reframed 
and for the U.S. to take concrete action to help resolve the conflict, protect human rights, and 
allow the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination. While there were 
changes and opportunities during these periods, the reformulations of the discourses of 
security and stability that were consistently invoked by policymakers foreclosed possibilities for 
real shifts in policy. The tensions, challenges and reformulations revealed in this analysis are 
best understood as part of the performative nature of the process of statecraft, and will help to 
identify methods and moments of intervention to change the narrative on this conflict.   
My second chapter locates the conflict within the framework of the Cold War and the 
effect of this framework on the narrative that emerged in the United States regarding the 
Western Sahara bounded loosely by the years 1975 to 1990.  I focus on the beginning of the 
conflict in 1975, the involvement of the United States in supplying arms to Morocco, and the 
debates over this policy in various congressional hearings. This chapter addresses the question: 
What were the discourses applied to the Western Sahara conflict and what does this show about the way that 
American policymakers saw the world and their place in it during this period?   
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My third chapter centers on the end of the Cold War and the involvement of the 
United States in United Nations efforts to resolve the conflict.  I explore changes in thinking 
about foreign policy that emerged during this transition period, and its impact on the narrative 
told in the United States about the Western Sahara conflict from 1991 to approximately 2000.  
This chapter focuses on the ways that policymakers debated and re-imagined the role of the 
United States in the new post-Cold War order and how this affected the (ir)resolution of the 
Western Sahara conflict. 
My fourth chapter centers around the impact of the emerging framework of the War 
on Terror on the U.S. narrative of the Western Sahara conflict.  This chapter addresses the 
question: How did the discourse of the War on Terror and the new security situation shape representations of 
the Western Sahara conflict and what have been the effects of this discourse on the region and on the self-
conception of the U.S.?  I look at the language used to explain and justify efforts to securitize and 
militarize U.S. policy in this region, and how the increasing incorporation of the Western 
Sahara and Maghreb/Sahel region into the narrative of the global war on terror has further 
entrenched the irresolution of this conflict to the benefit of Morocco and the United States. 
These three body chapters lead me to a concluding chapter that highlights the 
moments of opportunity for change that were foreclosed and begins to suggest possibilities for 
intervening in and changing prevailing narratives on this conflict and of foreign policy in 
general. I argue that the foreign policy discourse of the United States on this distant and 
obscure conflict helped to reformulate and maintain its self-conception as an imperial state and 
benevolent hegemon.  My concluding chapter then briefly discusses what voices, narratives, 
and alternative political frameworks are/were silenced by the dominant narratives in the 
United States on this region, and what the implications of this silencing are for the Sahrawis 
affected by this conflict as well as for American citizens/subjects.   
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Chapter Two: The Cold War Lens 
Congress: “How does one reconcile, however, a position of neutrality with a provision of arms to Morocco without any stipulation that 
those arms are not being used in the Western Sahara conflict?...I am simply asking how one reconciles a posture of neutrality with a 
provision of arms to be used in the conflict for only one side?” 
State Department: “Our position is neutral on the outcome, but we are not indifferent to the need to make progress toward a 
negotiated settlement…[T]here is a need to wrap up this conflict and stabilize the North African region.” 
~1981 Congressional hearing “Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict in Western Sahara: An Assessment of U.S. Policy.” 
Exchange between Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department 
of State and Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-MI). 
 
The geopolitics of the Cold War generated particular modes of viewing the world 
that United States policymakers were both subject to and also played a role in performing 
and reproducing. The conflict over the territory known as the Western Sahara emerged in 
the context of the political imperatives of the Cold War era, and was sustained in part 
because of the Cold War geopolitical lens employed by United States policymakers. The 
phrase “Cold War era” designates the period in world history shaped by the competition for 
global predominance between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
However the concept of the “Cold War era” also designates a set of political assumptions 
and imperatives that governed the statecraft of U.S. policymakers. The discourses at work 
during the Cold War were dominated by iterated performances of certain scripts of national 
security and national interest.   
The Cold War lens framed international politics as a tension between moralized 
binaries of good over evil, capitalism versus communism, democracy and freedom against 
political enslavement. The predominant narrative told the story of a ‘good,’ principled 
ideological system, that of the United States and its allies, pitted against an ‘evil,’ immoral 
and dangerous ideological system, the Soviet Union and its ‘satellites.’  The story was set in a 
world where power was projected from territorial states, produced and secured by military, 
economic and diplomatic means, and needed to be balanced in order to ensure the stability 
of world order. The narrative relied upon simplistic categories, and required that all actors fit 
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into a mold of either friend or enemy.  It was a world in which general discourses of 
necessity were deployed to justify specific realist pursuits of perceived interests. Cold War 
realism was concerned with instability, weak states, and political deviance, all concerns that 
were used to characterize the Western Sahara territory. In this story, these practices of 
representation interpellated40 the Western Sahara and the broader region of North Africa as a 
space that needed to be secured by the United States, acting with and through its ‘ally’ 
Morocco.  
It was within the Cold War discourses of security and interest that the Western 
Sahara was scripted as a place of concern to United States policymakers. The Cold War lens 
required policymakers to situate the Western Sahara conflict within a regional and global 
context of contemporary forces, actors, and events.  From the beginning of this conflict, a 
‘geopolitical gaze’ informed the lens used to view the region. 41 The term geopolitical gaze, as 
used by critical geopolitics scholar Gearoid O’Tuathail, refers to the spatialization of the 
world map according to a Western, imperial vantage point, measured by Western conceptual 
systems of identity and difference which brings places into the scope of Western geographic 
imaginings. This way of viewing the world inscribes certain identities onto places by virtue of 
their physical and political location.42 The geopolitical gaze is attentive to place and spatial 
location, and implies an imperial orientation that is both possessive and concerned with 
spheres of influence and power.  The practices of representation that constitute this 
geopolitical gaze participate in a cartographic violence rooted in legacies of colonialism. 
                                                
40 As articulated by Louis Althusser, the concept of interpellation describes the act of hailing—of naming, 
fixing and asserting power—to call someone or thing into being. 
41 Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Vol. 6 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996): 36. 
42 Ibid. 
29 
This chapter explores the language deployed43 by policymakers to understand and 
situate the Western Sahara conflict in their geopolitical imaginations.  Drawing on 
congressional hearings and State Department statements, the first half of the chapter traces 
the involvement of the United States in the initiation of the Moroccan invasion and 
subsequent war during the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.  I identify the various 
overlapping discourses used to script the Western Sahara conflict, and argue that discourses 
of security dominated representations of the conflict and U.S. involvement.  The second half 
of the chapter looks closely at the congressional debates over U.S. arms sales policy towards 
Morocco during the early stages of the Saharan War to identify points of tension and 
resistance to patterns of U.S. policymaking that were then foreclosed by the dominance of 
discourses of security.   
  
Mapping the U.S. role  
The strategic location and geographic character of the Western Sahara territory 
brought it to the attention of United States policymakers who thought of world politics in 
terms of the projection of power across space. This spatialized orientation shaped the way 
that both Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara territory were scripted in policymakers’ 
geographic imaginations.  Morocco, located at the entrance to the Mediterranean, poised 
between Europe, Africa and the Middle East,44 was well placed to be seen as a vital ally for a 
United States seeking to project power into this region and beyond.  The Western Sahara 
territory, located between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, was also situated as an 
                                                
43 I use the term ‘deployed’ in a highly self-conscious way that is aware of the militarism and violence that it 
implies. While I am personally uncomfortable with the use of military metaphors in diplomacy and politics, my 
usage is consistent with the prevailing discourse of policymakers. I chose to use the term ‘deploy’ to remind the 
reader of the material violences that these discourses produce, justify and enable.  
44 Zunes, Stephen and Jacob Mundy. Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. Syracuse Studies 
on Peace and Conflict Resolution. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010): 71. 
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important space of transition. In the binary world of the Cold War, political imperatives to 
control territorial space played out in superpower competition over ‘spheres of influence.’ 
Morocco’s geographic location made it a desired ally and a strategically useful addition to the 
U.S. sphere of influence. As such, Morocco’s role in the U.S. centric view of the world was 
as an administrator of areas of interest to the United States.  
Within the framework of the Cold War, both Morocco and the colonial power Spain, 
which had controlled the territory in question since 1884, were seen as pro-Western allies in 
the rivalry with the Soviet Union. In the mid 1970’s, as Spanish dictator General Franco lay 
on his deathbed, the United States grew increasingly concerned with the potential for 
destabilization in Spain during the inevitable transition of power.  At the same time, reports 
from the CIA influenced perceptions that King Hassan II of Morocco’s hold on the throne 
was tenuous and he faced domestic opposition.45 These concerns for the stability of U.S.-
allied regimes shaped the response of policymakers to the growing tension over the Western 
Sahara territory that emerged during this period.   
It is important to differentiate between the nature of these allied relationships. In the 
story continually told by U.S. policymakers, the United States has a long-standing 
relationship with Morocco, which was the first country to recognize the independence of the 
U.S. in 1777 and with whom the U.S. had sustained a Treaty of Friendship since 1787, the 
longest in U.S. history.  The strong relationship between the U.S. Army and Morocco dated 
to the Allied landing in Casablanca in 1942 and the U.S. maintained bases there until 1963. 
However the story of constant friendship with the Government of Morocco erases the story 
of the French and Spanish colonial intervention into a region at one point governed by a 
                                                
45 According to Ohaegbulam, “Ultimately, therefore, the stability of the Hassan regime was the principal 
consideration that influenced U.S. policy on the conflict.” Ohaegbulam, Festus Ugboaja. "Ethical Issues in US 
Policy on the Western Sahara Conflict." Mediterranean Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2002): 88-115. 
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Maghrebian sultanate and previously colonized by successive waves of Arab Islamic empires. 
U.S. policy toward Morocco centered the objective of preserving the current Moroccan 
monarchy as an ally of the West, a policy that maintains the nationalist myth that the modern 
Moroccan nation-state has always been as such. While U.S. policymakers rhetorically 
describe Morocco as an ‘ally,’ this relationship has always had paternalistic and imperial 
elements as policymakers interpellated Morocco as an assistant to achieving U.S. objectives 
in the North African region.  
Contemporary decolonization movements in Africa and elsewhere prompted three 
United Nations resolutions between 1960 and 1975 supporting the self-determination of the 
Sahrawi people which called on Spain to initiate a process of decolonization in, what was 
then, the Spanish Sahara.46 The United States abstained from these votes, later asserting that 
“We thought that [the resolutions] were deficient in that while they satisfied the interested of 
the indigenous peoples they did not respect all the legitimate interests of Spain. Our votes 
were consistent with our general objectives at the time.” This testimony, from State 
Department representative Nicholas Veliotes at the 1977 Congressional hearing on self-
determination in the Western Sahara, is representative of the U.S. tendency to support the 
rights of Western imperial powers over those of colonized peoples. This perspective then 
informed and enabled the involvement of the United States in the questionable legal and 
diplomatic behind-the-scenes process that lead to Morocco’s invasion of the territory in 
1975.   
                                                
46 The UN designated the Spanish Sahara as a non-self-governing territory in 1963, ensuring that it fell under 
the jurisdiction of UN Resolution 1514 of 1960 which established the right to independence for colonial 
countries and peoples. In 1965 the UN passed Resolution 2072, calling on Spain to initiate a process of 
decolonization. The U.S. abstained from a voting on Resolution 2229 in 1966 that explicitly granted the right to 
self-determination to the Spanish Sahara. The U.S. again abstained from Resolution 2983 in 1972 that 
supported the territory’s right to independence.  
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The Ford Administration and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger himself, were both 
aware of and also complicit in the process by which Morocco claimed sovereignty over the 
territory.  Leo Kamil, whose 1987 work Fueling the Fire documents the U.S. involvement in 
the early stages of this conflict, reported that the CIA notified Kissinger of Morocco’s plan 
to invade the Spanish Sahara three weeks before the event of the Green March. The United 
States played a private role in the Madrid Accords, which illegitimately negotiated the 
transfer of the Sahara territory from Spain to Morocco and Mauritania.47 In a 1978 interview, 
former CIA official Vernon Walters confirmed that he had played a role in the negotiations 
leading up to the Madrid Accords. He refused to discuss the details of the talks because “it 
would look like the King of Morocco and the King of Spain are pawns of the United States 
and that wouldn’t be in anybody’s interest.” 48 While both Morocco and Spain certainly acted 
on their own agendas in this process, it is clear that the United States played a larger role 
than it wanted to admit publically.49 While Zunes and Mundy (2010) are right to clarify that 
the conflict over the Western Sahara never took on the form of a proxy war between the 
U.S. and the USSR, it is useful to think of the ways that Morocco played proxy to exertions 
of U.S. power within its ‘sphere of influence.’  
In the days leading up to and following the Green March, a set of declassified 
conversations between Kissinger and Ford illuminate the geopolitical lens that informed and 
                                                
47 The Madrid Accords are not recognized as legitimate because Spain, as the colonial power that the UN had 
tasked with decolonizing their territory, did not have the legal power to transfer its sovereignty or 
administration to another national entity without an act of self-determination of the people of the territory. The 
Mauritanian role is not discussed in the scope of this project. Mauritania fought unsuccessful agains the 
Polisario for control of the southern third of the Western Saharan territory, until it concluded a peace 
agreement ceding the territory to the Polisario in 1978 in the context of an internal military coup in Mauritania.  
48 Quoted in Kamil, Leo. Fueling the Fire: US Policy & the Western Sahara Conflict. Vol. 1 (Red Sea Press, 1987): 11. 
49 Walters was required to link Spain’s request for $1.5 billion in U.S. weapons and the renewal of the lease for 
U.S. air and navy bases in Spain on generous terms with the letters of cooperation with Morocco on Western 
Sahara. See: Hodges, Tony. “At Odds with Self-determination: The United States and Western Sahara,” in 
African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Gerald J. Bender, James Smoot Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 264. 
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produced policy toward the region. By November 10th 1975, four days after the Green 
March, it was clear that these statemakers saw Moroccan control of the territory as integral 
to the stability of the Moroccan regime. Kissinger communicated to Ford, “Hassan has 
pulled back in the Sahara. But if he doesn’t get it, he is finished. We should now work to 
ensure he gets it. We would work through the UN to ensure a favorable vote.”50 The next 
day he pronounced, “the hope is for a rigged UN vote, but if it doesn’t happen 
soon…Hassan may be overthrown.” The stability of friendly regimes was clearly articulated 
as the primary interest of the United States on this issue, while the Sahara was spoken of 
simply as a territorial possession, devoid of a people and a legitimate resistance movement.51 
Kissinger’s assertion that the “U.S. would not allow another Angola on the east flank of the 
Atlantic Ocean”52 demonstrates both the prevailing orientation towards the ideas of 
balancing power between spheres of influence, and the hubris of a United States that 
envisioned itself as the center of the world. 
From the very beginning, the conflict was a point of contention between the 
Morocco and its regional rival Algeria, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement with whom 
the United States had a complicated relationship, to say the least. A declassified conversation 
between Kissinger and then Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika from December 17, 1975 
documents Bouteflika admonishing Kissinger for his pretense of neutrality towards the 
developing conflict over the territory. In response to a comment from Kissinger that for 
Cold War reasons they could not risk their relationship with Morocco and instead took a 
neutral position on the conflict, Bouteflika asserted, “Your role could never be marginal or 
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devoid of interest because obviously there was military cooperation with Morocco, so, given 
that, you could not be neutral between Morocco and Algeria.”53 Bouteflika, now president of 
Algeria and still an important player in the ongoing conflict, recognized the impossibility of 
U.S. neutrality in this conflict, yet U.S. policymakers have continued to describe the U.S. 
relationship to the conflict as if they were neutral.  
On the contrary, it is clear that not only has U.S. policy been consistently biased 
towards Morocco as an actor in this dispute, but that the United States played an active role 
in facilitating the occupation of the Western Sahara territory. On the eve of the Green 
March, the United States announced its intention to deliver 24 F-5E fighter planes to 
Morocco.54 In the weeks leading up to the Moroccan invasion, the U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations Daniel Patrick Moynihan was ordered to obstruct the Security Council from 
taking action against the impending Moroccan invasion.  Moynihan later admitted, “The 
United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The 
Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever 
measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no 
inconsiderable success."55 Despite their claims to neutrality, the geopolitical gaze 
interpellated both Morocco and the UN as tools to help policymakers accomplish their goals 
of maintaining power and control in North Africa, and interest to which the struggle for the 
independence of the Western Sahara was inconvenient. Publically the U.S. asserted its 
neutrality towards the outcome of the regional dispute, but privately supported Morocco’s 
efforts militarily and politically.  
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The policy of public neutrality and private support for Morocco carried through to 
successive administrations. According to Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in 1977, the “U.S. plays no role and have maintained a 
policy of neutrality” by recognizing Moroccan administrative control over the territory, 
though not its claims to sovereignty, and professing “no judgment” on the issue of self-
determination.56 When the Carter administration took power in 1977, it attempted to rebrand 
its foreign policy as a new shift towards respect for human rights in an effort to paint a new 
post-Vietnam image of the United States.  In a 1977 speech, President Jimmy Carter 
articulated his intention to follow a foreign policy doctrine “that is democratic, that is based 
on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane 
purposes.”57 In his speech Carter claimed that Americans were now “free of that inordinate 
fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.” 
Yet, the policy that the U.S. pursued with respect to the Morocco’s occupation of the 
Western Sahara during his administration is a salient example of support for an 
undemocratic and despotic monarch who violated international law by invading the Sahara 
and inflicted human rights abuses upon its population. Between 1974 and 1978, U.S. military 
aid to Morocco increased from $4.1 million to $99.8 million as the war in the Sahara 
escalated.58 The disconnect between the discourse of human rights and its application in 
policy is most evident in the debates over the arms sales policy to Morocco that I will engage 
with in the second part of this chapter. Under President Carter, arms sales to Morocco were 
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briefly restricted to limit their use in the Western Sahara territory, but resumed without any 
conditions in 1979.  
In a memo to Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski from National 
Security Council member William Quandt in 1977, the tendency of U.S. policymakers to 
regard the conflict through a geopolitical lens and to overlook the role of local desire for 
independence in the region is clear.  Quandt is frank about the fact that Morocco is in the 
wrong; he acknowledges “the simple fact that they annexed the territory by force” and that 
its claim to the territory is “not overwhelmingly impressive.”59 However, he dismisses the 
Sahrawis as a “small nomadic population” and notes that, “In any case, nomadic tribal 
allegiances have not been very stable, and the dominant sentiment is one of fierce 
independence and disregard for such niceties as frontiers.” The Western-centric language 
Quandt employs paints the Sahrawi people as uncivilized and premodern, stripping them of 
legal and moral power. He presents the conflict as one between Morocco and Algeria, and 
does not take the Polisario seriously as an independent actor.60 While Quandt notes that the 
issue is not “vital to world peace,” he advocates efforts to resolve it because the conflict 
impedes “more serious issues of [economic] development.” Haunting the interests 
articulated in U.S. policy towards this region is the impulse to ‘develop’ the region 
economically, a means of expanding and exerting U.S. power and paternalistic control over 
the region. 
The Reagan administration, which came to power in 1981, was frank in its pursuit of 
state interest and did not pretend to be concerned about human rights or the principles of 
international law. The tone of Reagan administration policy is well expressed by Jeanne 
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Kirkpatrick, a national security adviser to President Reagan.  Kirpatrick published a 1979 
article titled “Dictatorships and Double Standards” in which she criticized the Carter 
administration for prioritizing principles over interest, and laid the foundation for what 
would later be known as the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine.’ Acknowledging that “governments 
behave hypocritically when their principles conflict with the national interest,” she laid out a 
realist argument for supporting authoritarian governments whose interests align with our 
own.61 Central to her argument was both a strong anti-communist posture, and an assertion 
that the economic structure of authoritarian regimes, as opposed to totalitarian communism, 
was more in line with U.S. efforts at economic expansion through liberalization. Propping 
up dictators who supported economic policies beneficial to the United States was central to 
a set of foreign policy practices that assured continued access to resources in the post-
colonial era.  
While Kirkpatrick is generally credited with and criticized for imperialistic policies 
that supported repression by authoritarian dictatorships in Latin America, her “Kirkpatrick 
Doctrine” was similarly applied to Morocco in the case of its occupation of the Western 
Sahara. When the Reagan administration took power in 1981, the State Department explicitly 
articulated the importance of a strong friendship with Morocco for the benefit of U.S. 
interests. State Department representative Morris Draper asserted in a 1981 Congressional 
hearing, “It is, however, the prevailing view of this administration that America’s allies and 
close associates should expect understanding and reliable support. It would not be in the 
spirit of this administration’s policy if support for America’s traditional and historic 
friends—to meet reasonable and legitimate needs—were to be withheld or made conditional 
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other than under extraordinary circumstances.”62 Words like ‘reasonable’ and ‘legitimate’ 
(and the more recent overuse of ‘credible’ and ‘moderate’) were used to lend political 
legitimacy and authority to Morocco’s Sahara policy as it aligned with the U.S. interests in 
the region. 
Under the Reagan Administration, military and economic assistance to Morocco 
increased dramatically. According to political scientist David Seddon, “The justification for 
the large scale military aid provided to Morocco by the United States, in the words of the 
Reagan Administration's official budget request to Congress in 1985, is that 'it helps to 
maintain the stability of a pro-Western country.'”63 The designation of Morocco as ‘pro-
Western’ located it in the U.S. sphere and also interpellated it as an actor in the service of 
Western interests, rather than an ally on an equal playing field. As such, the United States 
intervened to help its client state to administer its own partially colonized territory. In 1981, 
a group of Pentagon and Defense Department officials visited the territory, followed by 
visits by Jeanne Kirkpatrick herself, CIA personnel and State Department officials.64 In 1982 
the United States and Morocco signed a joint military agreement, U.S. Green Berets were 
dispatched to the territory to help train and advise Moroccan forces, and the U.S. began 
providing intelligence assistance for the building of a defensive wall in the desert. The 
‘berm,’ as it is known, is a series of fortified sand walls defended by Moroccan troops and 
monitored with electronic surveillance provided by U.S. companies. Scholars have agreed 
that U.S. support for Morocco, and the building of the berm in particular, was fundamental 
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to its success in securing and maintaining control over most of the Western Sahara territory 
and for turning the tide of the war in Morocco’s favor.65 
The narratives of the Western Sahara that emerged in U.S. policy circles in the early 
stages of the conflict centered on its strategic importance geographically, the threat to the 
Moroccan ally, and the fear of destabilizing the region. In practice, Morocco was enlisted as 
a colonial administrator to maintain U.S. power and secure U.S. interests in North Africa. 
The primary motivations for U.S. concern over the region were connected to a Cold War 
spatialization of the world into spheres of influence. Through that cartographic lens, the 
Western Sahara was produced as a place that threatened the interests of the United States. 
The securitization of the region scripted the Western Sahara as a site of threat, danger and 
Otherness. To U.S. Cold Warriors, security was about power and control, its tools military 
and economic. It was in this context that U.S. policymakers debated and contested policies 
that provided arms and military support to Morocco. A close read of these debates reveals 
moments of discord and incoherence among policymakers that failed to resist the 
securitization of the region.  
 
Congressional debates over arms sales policy 
Starting in 1977, hearings held by congressional foreign relations committees on the 
subject of the Western Sahara provided a space for democratic deliberation over the interests 
and principles at stake in policy decisions towards this region. These hearings also provided a 
space for the relatively active Congress of the post-Watergate period to interrogate and 
challenge the policymaking of the executive branch. The tensions and debates between a 
variety of voices in these hearings reveal the multifaceted nature of U.S. statemaking, and the 
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role that policymakers play in performing the institution of the state. The performative 
discourses articulated in these hearings relied on practices of representation to make sense of 
the political situation. Seeing the state as performative helps to identify and unpack the 
incoherence of the policy assumptions and imperatives. As the debates show, imperatives, 
representations and ideas were contested and required constant reiteration in order to sustain 
their discursive power. The hearings were structured to open with a statement from the 
presiding chairman, included testimony from outside experts and State Department officials, 
and provided opportunities for congressmen to question and challenge them.  
Underlying the specific debates about policy towards the Western Sahara is an 
ongoing debate about the interests and principles of the United States. Foreign policy 
scholars in the liberal tradition tend to see decision-making as a choice between interests and 
principles. The congressional debates of this period help to illuminate how interests and 
principles were produced, and the relationship between them contested. 66 Through the lens 
of the Cold War, policymakers discussed the categories of interest and principle as if they 
were discrete and mutually exclusive. In general, policymakers defined national interest in 
terms of security, stability, and economic and political power.  The concepts of sovereignty, 
self-determination, human rights, and democracy are consistent principles present in the 
discourse of American foreign policy. However, as the hearings show, the boundaries of 
these designations are fluid and contested, and their meanings were in constant process of 
being constituted and performed.  
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The first of these hearings was held in 1977 by the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs to address the question of self-determination for Western Sahara and the 
implications for U.S. foreign policy. Nicholas Veliotes, the official who represented the State 
Department at this hearing, laid out a view of the interests at stake in the conflict that was 
deeply embedded in Cold War imperatives. He was concerned that the conflict would 
complicate “our longstanding and broadly based relations with Morocco—an influential 
moderate in the strategic North African area—and our friendly relations with Mauritania, on 
the one hand; or our important economic interests and improving relations with Algeria on 
the other.”67 Veliotes framed the conflict as one between Morocco and Algeria, referencing 
Polisario only as “a Sahrawi guerrilla group.” The term guerrilla is used to classify the 
Polisario’s violence as illegitimate in contrast to the legitimate violence of the Moroccan 
state. Despite the fact that the hearing was ostensibly about the question of self-
determination, Veliotes claimed that it was State policy to not make a judgment on whether 
an act of self-determination had taken place in the Sahara. His framing of the conflict failed 
to consider the rights of Sahrawi people. Instead, Veliotes focused on the State 
Department’s concern that the conflict might become a site of contestation between the 
great powers.  
This framing of the conflict helped to normalize a self-contradictory and contested 
policy of expressing neutrality while providing arms to Morocco. A 1960 treaty restricted the 
U.S. arms provided to Morocco for use within Morocco’s internationally recognized 
territory.  State Department officials were vague, at first, regarding whether or not Morocco 
was using U.S. arms in the Western Sahara war. It soon became clear that they were, a fact 
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admitted by Veliotes in testimony.68 In 1979, a congressional hearing on the arms sales policy 
opened up debate on whether or not to continue providing arms to Morocco, and whether 
or not to restrict those weapons for use in the Western Sahara.  
Congressman Stephen Solarz began the 1979 hearing by placing the Western Sahara 
conflict in the context of U.S. military interests. He asserted, “U.S. interests in the conflict go 
beyond questions of self-determination and international law. The Moroccan monarchy has 
been traditionally friendly to the United States. It permits our 6th Fleet to call at its ports, has 
encouraged the Israeli-Egyptian peace proposal, quietly sent troops to help preserve Western 
interests in Zaire’s Shaba province and has acted as a moderate force in various international 
forums.” Morocco’s military cooperation and assistance demonstrates its status as an 
administrator to U.S. interests, who was treated less as an ally, than as a resource to use to 
defend U.S. imperial interests. Subject to the discourse of the Cold War, Solarz was 
concerned with the idea that “War between Algeria and Morocco, which is a clear and 
present danger, could draw the U.S. into a serious confrontation with the Soviet Union.” 
This geopolitical gaze refused the separation of local conflicts from the broader narrative of 
global conflict, and led U.S. policymakers to value the strategic, military position of 
compliant Morocco above the issues of international law. 
The State Department official who testified in the 1979 hearing, Harold Saunders, 
described the conflict in a similar framework.  Saunders began his testimony by 
“underscoring the American interests in this area.” He emphasized “the importance of this 
area on the southern coast of the Mediterranean to us strategically” and the “important 
national resources, petroleum and phosphates in these areas.” To the State Department at 
this time, the region was important because of its militarily useful location and the potential 
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benefit of natural resources, in particular speculation about oil. The region was viewed as a 
place from which to extract resources and from which to base military action, a view which 
required the U.S. efforts to ‘secure’ it under their sphere of influence.  
However, other voices in the hearing expressed concern that arms sales to Morocco 
were in fact detrimental to U.S. interests in the region. Congressman Houser, for example, 
asserted that continued U.S. arms sales to Morocco were contributing to the destabilization 
of the region, and undermined U.S. interest because the inconsistency between Washington’s 
professed neutrality and the arms sales was eroding U.S. credibility with Africa and other 
parts of the world.69 Congressional challenge to the policy of providing arms for Morocco 
pushed the administration to restrict the sales of offensive weapons to Morocco as a small 
attempt to prevent the use of U.S. weapons in the Western Sahara. In general, these 
contestations of the dominant narratives objected to strategy and tactics, rather than the 
overall aim of exercising U.S. power in regions around the globe. The policy of restricting 
arms for Morocco was dropped in late 1979 in response to ongoing events in the global 
political climate.   
The fall of the U.S. backed Shah in Iran in 1979 gave strength to the fear that King 
Hassan’s friendly regime was at risk, and the restrictions on the use of arms were removed.70 
According to a statement by Congressman Solarz, who ultimately disagreed with the change 
in policy, recognized that “a change in our [arms] policy would be seen by other countries as 
a manifestation of our overall global credibility in the aftermath of perceived defeats in 
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Angola, Iran and Nicaragua.”71 According to political scientist Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, 
“concerns that arose in Washington about the stability of the Moroccan monarchy after the 
fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
prompted the administration to decide to strengthen security ties with traditional U.S. allies 
in the Third World.”72 This the concern for the stability of the Moroccan monarchy was 
placed in context with other ongoing Cold War proxy conflict’s (or conflicts that were 
represented as such) in Angola, Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Ohaegbulam writes, 
“During the Cold War, when the U.S. globalist view that local conflicts were primarily the 
result of America’s geopolitical rivalry with the Soviet Union, U.S. administrations never 
perceived Morocco or the entire northwestern Africa region as part of the vital security 
interests of the United States. Yet the administrations acted as if Morocco were one, a U.S. 
ally against the Soviets and their northwestern African surrogates.”73 The views of 
policymakers on the Western Sahara conflict were influenced by the geopolitical and global 
power-balancing discourses of the time, which carried through in their relationship with 
Morocco.74  
Harold Saunders, as the official representing the State Department at a 1980 hearing, 
announced that the “Administration proposed to thread its way through the labyrinth by 
reversing its previous policy of refusing to sell Morocco arms suited for use in the Western 
Sahara and attempting to use the new sales of counterinsurgency equipment as a means of 
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acquiring leverage on the parties to promote a compromise negotiated settlement.”75  The 
new policy was rooted in the idea supplying arms would give the U.S. more leverage to 
resolve the conflict. It is clear that selling arms to one side only is an irreconcilable strategy 
for resolving a conflict with a pretense of neutrality. Instead, supplying arms to Morocco was 
a means of exerting U.S. power in the region and supporting its own interests through its 
client state. Speaking to the administration’s plans to sell to Morocco an additional $232.5 
million worth of military aircraft in 1980, Saunders added, “We believe an outright victory 
over Morocco by Morocco’s adversaries would constitute a serious setback to major U.S. 
interests.”76 
Under the Reagan administration arms sales increased, as did Congressional 
skepticism to this strategy. The extent of Congress’ discomfort with State Department policy 
under Reagan can be read into the report produced by a 1982 Report of the Staff Study 
Mission to Western Sahara. A group of staffers for the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
traveled to the region and met with officials in Paris, Rabat, Laayoune, Tindouf and Algiers. 
Their highly critical report asserted, “Continuation of the conflict, along with the perceived 
US tilt toward Morocco, contains serious risks for a number of important US interests.”77 
The committee staff members identified a broad range of U.S. foreign policy interests at 
stake in the conflict: “maintenance of good bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria, 
which impact on our strategic interests in the Mediterranean, concern that existing regional 
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conflicts not escalate and become internationalized, our traditional support for the self-
determination of colonized peoples, and relations with the Organization of African Unity 
and such important friends as France, Spain, and Saudi Arabia.” By emphasizing self-
determination and the importance of working with multilateral institutions, this articulation 
of the interests at stake in this conflict challenged the exclusively realist policies of Reagan-
era State Department officials.  
The staffers recognized that the effect of pro-Morocco policies undermined some of 
the professed interests of the state.  They did not challenge the consensus that the U.S. 
should exert power to control the region. It was still a place that needed to be secured by the 
United States, but they did challenge the realist and militarist strategies to pursued by the 
Reagan administration to do so. Their critical report sought to change policy in order to align 
with their perceptions of American interest, rooted in commitment to American values.  The 
report’s claim that “U.S. support for the principle of national self-determination is also a 
major U.S. asset in world diplomacy and a striking contrast to the behavior of its Soviet 
rival” was an attempt to reorient the understanding of U.S. national interests around the 
principle of self-determination.78 Their attempt to redefine U.S. interests in this conflict had 
little impact on Reagan administration policy.  This missed opportunity to redirect U.S. 
policy demonstrates a longstanding divergence between foundational principles and 
perceptions of interest, as well as differences in the strategies to pursue them. 
The Reagan administration framed its military assistance to Morocco as a means of 
helping to resolve the conflict and maintain the stability of the region. Military support for 
Morocco, from arms sales, U.S. contractors, Green Berets, military advisors, and 
technological assistance with building of the berm, was clearly designed to help resolve the 
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war by aiding a de facto victory for Morocco, rather than enabling negotiation as the State 
Department pretended. The depth of involvement of the United States in the Saharan war 
indicates the success of the efforts to securitize the region by representing it as a threat.79  
 
Securitization of the Western Sahara region 
The idea that the conflict in the Western Sahara posed a security risk, however 
remote, to the United States was directly linked to the geopolitical thinking that located the 
territory in a broad region of power politics.  Looking at the conflict through the lens of U.S. 
Cold Warriors, we can understand that their geopolitical concerns were part of their 
performance as statemakers intent on projecting and performing the power of the U.S. State.  
Statemaking, to them, required that external, peripheral areas be painted as places of 
potential danger and as threats to the interests of the State. Congressman Stephen Solarz, 
introducing the issue at the 1979 Congressional hearing, asserted that the conflict itself 
“presents a major threat to peace and political stability in North Africa and contains serious 
implications for U.S. international diplomacy in the Middle East and Africa.”80 This process 
of securitizing the conflict was enabled by a number of strands of thinking and speaking 
about the region, and helped to produce the identities of the statemakers and of the State 
itself.   
The idea that the conflict posed a danger to the United States was reflected in the 
constantly repeated refrain about the potential for the conflict to escalate into a great power 
confrontation. As Congressman Solarz expressed in 1980, the fear was that “continued 
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conflict over the Western Sahara could eventually jeopardize economic and political stability 
in Morocco, escalate into broader regional conflict and attract great power intervention.”81  
This fear both reflected a broad Cold War concern, and also produced the possibility for this 
to become the reality. The framing of the conflict within the Cold War balance of power 
imperative was a discursive practice that helped to securitize the region in policymakers’ 
language and practices.  
This framework required that the actors involved in the conflict be understood as 
located on one or the other side of the divide between friend and enemy. Reflecting on the 
conflict much later, statesman James Baker emphasized the friend/enemy dimension in his 
explanation of why the U.S. provided intelligence to help Morocco build the berm. He 
observed, “Now that was back in the days of the Cold War when the POLISARIO Front 
was aligned with Cuba and Libya and some other enemies of the United States, and 
Morocco was very close to the United States.”82 By invoking classic ‘rogue states’ that 
received support from the Soviet Union, policymakers tarred the Polisario with the same 
brush as other generally recognized U.S. enemies. Lumping the Polisario with Libya and 
Cuba helped to close the gap between an obscure local conflict and a threat to the global 
superpower.  
There were moments when the black and white binary simplicity of the Cold War 
lens was recognized and challenged by some officials, but their resistance to this way of 
thinking was overshadowed by security concerns. In a 1981 hearing on U.S. policy, former 
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Ambassador to Algeria, Ulrich Haynes, expressed his concern about viewing the conflict 
through this frame: 
I am terribly concerned that we not get involved in yet another exercise of self-
deception. We seem prone to do that, particularly in foreign policy, because it is easy 
to think in simplistic terms. And the Libyans are the bad guys these days. If we could 
prove that there was a Libyan connection, it would make it very much easier for us 
to adopt a negative, very strongly negative posture toward the Polisario.83   
Haynes astutely recognized and called out the tendency to put places and people into 
clearly defined boxes of good and evil. Haynes expressed his concern that the lens of the 
Cold War was coloring policymakers’ interpretations of the conflict, and instead 
recommended instead a strict policy of neutrality. However, his voice was an anomaly in a 
sea of official voices urging support for our ‘friend’ Morocco.   
The securitization of the region was not limited to a particular administration, but 
carried over, in different forms, from one to another. Despite the fact that the Carter 
administration made a point of stressing human rights in foreign policy, the conflict was 
never painted as a threat to individual or normative human rights by U.S. officials during this 
period. Instead, it was under Carter that the restriction on arms sales was originally dropped 
to allow sales of offensive weapons to Morocco, ignoring issues of human rights violations.  
Under the Reagan administration, the characterization of the Western Sahara conflict 
as a ‘security risk’ was enhanced. In their 1982 report, congressional staff members identified 
“shifts in U.S. perceptions of its security interests” as contributing to the change in indirect 
American involvement in the conflict.84 After the 1982 congressional staff delegation, the 
Reagan administration came out with a new justification for their arms policy. According to 
Kamil, “the U.S. has agreed to provide assistance specifically designed to counter the ‘new 
threat’ from the Polisario in the Western Sahara, and that the assistance will help reestablish 
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a so-called ‘military equilibrium’ in the Sahara war.”85 The nature of a security interest is 
determined by a perception of threat, which were constructed and imagined to varying 
degrees. These congressional staff observers and critics of Reagan’s policy note that he “has 
sometimes tended to view the issue as an East-West Struggle, a view generally disputed by 
regional specialists.” With this acknowledgement of the role of threat perception in the 
development of policy, these observers touched upon the inherent constructed nature of the 
concept of security. Constructing the Western Sahara as a security threat enabled the U.S. to 
‘manage’ the region in a patriarchal manner. 
Apart from a perceived threat to the economic and political power of the United 
States and its allies, the fear of Soviet infliltration also played a role in the ideological 
characterization of the threat that the Polisario posed. Speaking in 1983, Congressman 
Simon asserted that “Their terminology is Marxist, there is a Marxist leaning on the part of 
the Polisario leadership.”86 However as Yahia Zoubir has examined in detail in his article on 
Soviet policy towards the Western Sahara conflict, the Soviet Union provided no direct 
support to the Polisario (the only liberation movement on the African continent that did not 
receive direct Soviet support).87 The fear of communism continues to be consistently 
referenced as a means of demonizing the Polisario. 
Another indication of the perception that the Western Sahara conflict posed a 
security threat to the U.S. is that much information about U.S. policy remains classified, 
including sections of these congressional hearings that were closed to the public. In 1979, 
the State Department official called to testify before the congressional hearing insisted upon 
holding some of the discussion on Western Sahara and Morocco in a closed executive 
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session. In response to this request, the chair of the committee, Congressman Solarz, 
responded, “Generally, when we go into executive session, it involves highly classified 
materials which relate to national security or other developments which would not be to the 
advantage of the Nation to become public. And I am not quite sure that applies here.”88  
Despite Congressional pushback, the State Department representatives had their way. On 
several occasions they made statements at the public hearings and insisted on a private, and 
still classified, sessions to discuss policy options. The State Department had determined that 
the Western Sahara conflict was a threat to national security and reinforced that 
characterization as time went on.   
The form of security that U.S. Cold Warriors were concerned with was limited to 
ideas of military power and economic development, security for them could not be 
understood outside of military and economic interests.  Leo Kamil, writing in 1987, 
recognized that the U.S. prioritization of military security was at the expense of other 
considerations of human security.  He noted, “despite the steady deterioration of the 
Moroccan economy as a result of the war costs and a severe drought, United States 
development and food aid for Morocco remained meager because the priority was given to 
the improvement of the Moroccan army’s performance in Western Sahara.”89 Kamil was 
adamant that the ongoing military aid and uncritical support from the United States was 
actually contributing to destabilizing an already insecure region.   
A recently declassified National Security Directive produced by the Reagan 
administration in 1985 outlines U.S. policy towards North Africa with an emphasis on the 
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Western Sahara conflict and its “risks for American interests.”90 The security directive is 
concerned about the conflict’s effect on the balance of power in the region, particularly in 
the context of “the region’s geo-strategic position opposite NATO’s southern flank, the 
potential for increased Soviet regional influence and the dangers of Libyan adventurism.”  
With these risks in mind, the policy directives in the document include strengthening the 
joint economic and military relationships with Morocco, but also explicitly require that this 
assistance have low visibility. One of the policy objectives with respect to Morocco remains 
entirely redacted in the declassified document, maintaining the secrecy of U.S. policy actions 
towards this region. The directive does call for public statements of support for political 
settlement of the issue, though it notes that “if necessary, veto SADR membership in the 
UN Security Council.” Such a veto never became necessary, but the directive indicates the 
policy intention to manage the region in accordance with U.S. interests. 
The effect of securitizing the Western Sahara during this period had material and 
discursive components. Materially, characterizing the territory as a potential danger meant 
that the military assistance in the form of aid, arms sales, advisors and joint exercises, was 
politically justified. Securitizing the region allowed the United States to project military 
power and influence into the North African region that it determined to be of strategic 
importance. In the minds of policymakers and observers of this conflict, the discursive 
securitization of the Sahara compressed space, bringing a regional conflict closer to the 
superpower. Painting the events in the territory as a potential threat to the United States 
reduced the physical space between the local conflict and the United States. Performing 
statecraft in response to threat expanded and solidified the boundaries of American power, 
and contributed to the America’s self-understanding as superpower. The discourse of 
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security threats in the Sahara also shored up an idea of the United States as the guarantor of 
security in the world. 
U.S. policymakers understood the Western Sahara conflict from a primarily realist 
perspective, enacting policy in accordance with the perceived interests of the United States.  
The key is that the language and lenses used to look at this conflict were limited by 
policymakers conceptions of what those interests are and how to achieve them.  The 
predominant perceptions of national interest, including stability, security, economic, and 
power-balancing, delimited the choices available to policymakers. Viewing the conflict 
through a regional, geopolitical lens required policymakers to make decisions based on their 
narrow perceptions of U.S. interest, and obscured the narrative of self-determination-seeking 
Sahrawi people. Policymakers performed this perspective through their practices of 
representation and policy decisions to aid the Government of Morocco.  
As historian Andrew Bacevich points out in American Empire, the realist idea that 
United States foreign policy is governed by perceptions of its national interest is not new. 
Historian Charles Beard wrote in 1935, “nations are governed by their interests as their 
statesmen conceive these interests.”91 The interests that statesmen perceive as essential to the 
nation are rooted in a desire for the self-perpetuation of power. That is to say, U.S. national 
interests are defined in order to aggrandize and maintain the political and economic power 
of state institutions and powerful individuals who make, or benefit from, policy.  This is no 
less true in the case of U.S. policy towards the Western Sahara conflict, despite the small 
scale and relative obscurity of the conflict.  As a place peripheral to Washington, the Western 
Sahara was a site where U.S. imperial power was produced, and contested, and aided by 
Morocco acting in the role of colonial administrator.  
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As we have seen, the discourse of statesmen and policymakers produced 
perceptions, characterizations and realities that shaped the relationship of the U.S. to the 
world. The idea that the discourse of statesmen produced of power and knowledge became 
even more important as ideas about international political order were questioned, 
transitioned and were rearticulated. In the next chapter, I explore how the discourses on the 
Western Sahara changed and remained consistent after the end of the Cold War in a period 
of reorienting and reshaping global politics. As Zunes and Mundy note, “U.S. support for 
Morocco’s conquest outlasted and transcends Cold War rationale.”92 In other words, the 
modes of thought that produced U.S. policy toward the region were rooted in larger 
assumptions about power and statecraft than simply the Cold War lens. 
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Chapter Three: A New World Order? 
“Our eyes have witnessed dramatic marches toward freedom and democracy on the world state in recent history. We have seen the 
birth of new nations in Eastern Europe, the crumbling of the wall in Germany, the preservation of sovereignty in Kuwait, and the 
creation of multiparty systems and national conferences all through Africa. There are now a people in North Africa living in 
Western Sahara named the Saharawis. They are not known to many Americans. They are struggling for the right to vote on their 
future, as to whether they will have their own country or be part of Morocco and it is a matter for them to decide.” 
~Congressman Mervyn Dymally, 1991 Hearing on the U.N. Peace Plan and Referendum on the Western Sahara 
 
The end of the Cold War enabled a moment of reflection for political leaders, 
policymakers, intellectuals, media and citizens to reevaluate the role of the United States in 
the world, its self-characterizations and the nature of the state itself. The questions of 
traditional policy thinkers centered on how to maintain global order and American power in 
a fundamentally changing world. Would the new global world be dominated by the unipolar 
American hegemon? Would collective security, moderated by international institutions be 
the best way to serve U.S. interests? During the first decade after the end of the Cold War 
new ways of thinking about the U.S and the world were pursued and old frameworks were 
recycled and reformulated. This chapter explores the changes and consistencies across this 
period shaped the questions and policy imperatives for U.S. statemakers and how their 
decisions affected the development of the Western Sahara conflict. I ask, what new 
approaches to resolving the conflict were made possible during this period, and what ways 
of thinking about the conflict were foreclosed by the discourses of this period? In this 
analysis, conceptualizations of security and the state, as well as the ideas about American 
interests that accompanied them, are central.   
While the end of the Cold War supposedly ushered forth a new era of global politics 
and U.S. foreign policy, the years that followed retained many of the political assumptions, 
categories, and modes of thinking that had shaped earlier periods. The geopolitical lens 
through which policymakers viewed the Western Sahara was affected by their perceptions of 
what the new global political context meant for U.S. statemaking. The reorganization and 
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reframing of U.S. policy interests and goals were part of the process of performing an 
increasingly hegemonic and imperial American State. James Baker III, Secretary of State 
from 1989 to 1992, understood his tenure as the period in which “the very nature of the 
international system was transformed.”93 According to Baker, political leaders and 
government officials of this period saw their job to “harness, shape and manage those 
seismic geopolitical changes in the strategic interests of our country.”94 With the decline of 
its superpower rival assured, the United States set its sights on growing and maintaining its 
powerful position as global hegemon. 
The discourse of newness, seen in statements about the “end of history” 95 and the 
“New World Order”96 reinforced the sense of the exceptionality of the current moment and 
encouraged the perception that there had been a firm break with the past. This mode of 
thought blinded policymakers from acknowledging the continuities and similarities between 
their policies before and after the Cold War. The newness discourse promoted the 
perception that fundamental change had occurred in the world, and that it left the United 
States as both the victor in a global power struggle and morally vindicated by the triumph of 
capitalism in the ideological battle. U.S. policymakers imagined the United States as the 
uniquely powerful leader of this new world, promoter of democracy and free market 
capitalism, with the imperative to secure its power and position. The meanings of security in 
this new era took on new forms as the U.S. sought to secure its economic, military and 
political interests and identified new kinds of threats. The shift towards prioritizing the 
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rhetoric of democracy and collective security, efforts to dominate international institutions, 
and to open economic barriers to U.S. trade produced neo-imperial relationships and 
required imperial practices to perform and secure American power.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War coincided with a 
major turning point in the conflict over the Western Sahara. After several years of 
negotiations, the United Nations implemented a ceasefire between Morocco and the 
Polisario in September 1991. The second part of the UN peace plan proved to be far more 
difficult to accomplish; a referendum for the people of Western Sahara to exercise self-
determination. The long-promised referendum has yet to take place, after over 20 years of 
feeble efforts from the UN peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara (known as 
MINURSO). Over the course of the period examined in this chapter (1991-2000), the 
United States was closely engaged with the UN peace process. The resolution process for 
this already long-standing conflict was initially framed within the hopeful rhetoric of a new, 
and more peaceful, democratic world order. The 1991 hearing on the UN Peace Plan opened 
with an impassioned statement from Chairman Dymally, who scripted the Sahrawi case into 
the context of contemporaneous struggles for democracy and freedom in the former East 
Bloc countries.97 The resolution of the Western Sahara conflict should have been a 
triumphant first step for post-Cold War cooperative diplomacy through the UN, but U.S. 
support for Morocco’s intransience prevented the successful resolution of a conflict that 
continues to this day.  
This chapter explores changes in the geographical imaginations of U.S. policymakers 
after the end of the Cold War, and identifies new lenses and new modes of performing the 
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U.S. state through the discourses that policymakers deployed to script the Western Sahara in 
the new global order. While much policy debate and prescription from this period was 
private or remains classified, some insights can be gleaned by looking at what was made 
public through official statements, speeches, records and declassified documents. The first 
part of the chapter chronologically traces the representations of the region expressed in 
congressional hearings, resolutions, and State Department statements in 1991, 1992, 1997, 
1998 and 2000. The second section of this chapter uses a detailed analysis of the language of 
the State Department Human Rights reports on the Western Sahara from 1991 to 2000 to 
identify key shifts and conflicting representations of this conflict. The third part of this 
chapter explores the process of securitizing the Western Sahara region in U.S. discourse and 
the changing meanings and usages of the concept of security in the performance of 
American state power. I argue that new modes of securitization were deployed to impose 
particular geopolitical imaginations of world order than maintained American dominance, 
and in the process denied the Sahrawi people the right to self-determination.   
 
Representations in Congressional hearings 
As the first post-Cold War decade unfolded state identities, mechanisms of global 
power, and ideas about the organization of international political space were reconsidered 
and performed in different ways. U.S. policymakers debated and rethought some of their 
Cold War assumptions about exercising power in the international system, while retaining 
other deeply engrained frameworks. In the post-Cold War realignment of U.S. priorities, 
conflicts were no longer seen as opportunities to advance interests (as proxy wars and 
regional conflicts had served during the Cold War), but as blockades to interest. The U.S. 
approach to the conflict thus shifted away from providing military support for Morocco to 
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win the war towards political efforts to resolve the conflict in the United Nations. This did 
not mean, however, that the U.S. stopped favoring (and materially supporting) Morocco, nor 
that the U.S. accorded more political legitimacy to the Sahrawi people. Policymakers paid 
more rhetorical tribute to ideas of human rights and international cooperation, yet retained 
imperial understandings of power and interest. The concepts of security and stability 
remained central to statemaking, but those concepts underwent shifts in meaning and 
produced new imperatives and relationships. While new approaches to global politics were 
debated in academic and political circles, officials steeped in realist Cold War international 
relations theory continued to perform and reproduce those frameworks in the emerging 
global arena. The practice of realist assumptions about power, interest and statehood 
foreclosed more complex and insightful ways of reading and responding to events in the 
world.   
The realist assumptions maintained by Bush administration officials are nowhere 
more frank or unapologetic than the leaked draft Defense Planning Guidance from 1992.98  
This document, though later retracted and denied by the administration due to public 
criticism, clearly articulates the realist assumptions about power and interest that prevailed 
through the post Cold War transition.99 Drafted primarily by Defense Department official 
Paul Wolfowitz, the document lays out a strategy for maintaining American superpower 
status. The document advocates for a unipolar world of American dominance secured 
through collective security agreements, and, when necessary, unilateral action. The exercise 
of American hegemony played out in its role in the United Nations, where the U.S. aided 
and excused Morocco’s obstructions of the peace process. The United States worked to 
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ensure that the efforts of the UN corresponded with U.S. interests in the region, and 
employed the international body in its imperial power practices.  
Congressional leaders, outside experts and State Department officials gathered to 
discuss the UN peace plan for Western Sahara and the role that the United States should 
play in its implementation in a 1991 congressional hearing. The hearing squarely located the 
Western Sahara conflict in the context of global political transformations. As one expert 
testified, “We have seen now that the Berlin Wall is down, the Iron Curtain is down, but 
tragically, I think, one wall does remain besides the Great Wall of China, and that is the wall 
in Western Sahara.”100 Despite the rhetorical hope for a globalized and borderless New 
World Order, the wall in the Western Sahara remained equally, if not increasingly, 
militarized, entrenched and defended, a violent symbol of the continued intractability of the 
conflict.101   
This intractability was encouraged by the discrepancy between the U.S. official 
position of neutrality and its failure to press for the conflict to be resolved in accordance 
with international law. In the 1991 hearing, State Department official John Wolf articulated 
the official U.S. position on the conflict: “The United States fully supports the concept of a 
UN referendum as the best means to resolve the status of the Western Sahara and the 
United States is committed to the conduct of a free and fair referendum.”102 This articulation 
provided the theme for official statements of U.S. policy towards the conflict for the next 
decade. Despite the articulated support for the referendum, the U.S. bias in favor of 
Morocco came through in Wolf’s testimony. He reported that the U.S. was in constant 
dialogue with Moroccan officials, but had limited contact with Polisario because, as they 
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were not recognized as rulers of a sovereign state, they could not engage with U.S. officials 
on an equal playing field.103 Statehood, which required territorial sovereignty, was the only 
way for these U.S. policymakers to imagine political legitimacy. The U.S. recognition of 
Morocco’s administrative control over the territory precluded them from taking seriously the 
political claims made by Saharawi groups, especially the militant Polisario. 
In a moment of tension between Congressional leaders and the State Department, 
representatives expressed their concern that State Department policy towards the Western 
Sahara was not sufficiently independent from the influence of other foreign policy 
considerations. In the 1991 hearing, Congressman Faleomavaega pressured State official 
John Wolf to assure Congress that the policy of the United States toward the referendum 
and UN peace plan was “in no way” connected to the fact that King Hassan had sent 
Moroccan troops to fight with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf War.104 The cagey State 
Department official replied that “our bilateral relationship with Morocco is a discrete area,” 
but that to the best of his knowledge, the issues were separate in both public and private 
performances of policy. 
The 1992 hearing on the status of the UN peace plan begins with an important 
illustration of the American national interests perceived to be at stake in the process to 
resolve the Western Sahara conflict. Chairman Dymally begins the session by claiming that 
the peace plan is important, first, because the United States was paying for it, second, 
because U.S. troops were involved in MINURSO, third, because the role of the United 
States as a defender of freedom was at stake, and fourth, because the credibility of the 
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United Nations and commitment to international norms were also on the line. Dymally thus 
expressed a widely held consensus of the hierarchy of U.S. interests: defense of economic 
investments, military security, principled international reputation, and the stability of the 
status quo world order that served its interests. These interests would crop up again and 
again as the U.S. sought to preserve its global dominance.  
This global predominance of power meant that the U.S. had a deciding role to play 
in the practices of international institutions such as the UN. How the U.S. chose to wield 
that power was indicative of its self-conception and perception of interests.  In the unfolding 
drama of the MINURSO peacekeeping mission’s efforts to resolve the Western Sahara 
conflict, the U.S. essentially refused to assert this power to move the process along towards 
resolution.  Testifying in 1992, Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that he was 
simply following the example of the Secretary General in trying to not apportion blame to 
one side or another for stalling the referendum process.105  However, it was clear at the time 
that Morocco bore most of the blame for the delays in the referendum’s implementation. It 
held MINURSO supplies hostage at customs for several months, incentivized tens of 
thousands of Moroccans to move to the territory (using tax incentives, employment 
opportunities and subsidies), and added 120,000 new names to the list of people to be 
considered for voting in the referendum. As is clear in Bolton’s statement, and subsequent 
ones made by other officials, the United States was reluctant to point a finger at Morocco for 
obstructing the peace process, and continued its public policy of neutrality as the peace 
process stalled. 
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In an effort to follow through on its commitments to resolving the conflict through 
the auspices of the United Nations, the United States initiated the formation of a Security 
Council “Group of Friends of the Western Sahara” in 1993. As Teresa Whitfield 
demonstrates, this group has done very little to pressure the parties to resolve the conflict. 
Whitfield attributes this ineffectiveness to a lack of coherence between the national interests 
of the core members (France, Spain, Russia, the UK and the United States) and between 
those interests and the goals of the United Nations.106 More than simply ineffective, the 
members of the Group of Friends have exercised their power within the Security Council to 
obstruct progress on the resolution of the conflict, and to dominate other voices on the 
issue, in accordance with their own perceived national interests. 
By 1995, the efforts at resolution had come to a halt and the United Nations called 
the referendum dead.  In 1997, in an attempt throw political weight behind the peace 
process in order to maintain the UN’s own credibility, the Security Council appointed a U.S. 
policymaker of significant stature. James Baker III, a Cold Warrior who had served in the 
Ford administration, as President Reagan’s Chief of Staff, and as Secretary of State under 
President Bush, was chosen to restart political negotiation between the parties.  Baker served 
as Special Envoy from 1997 to 2004, when he resigned in frustration over the irresolution of 
the conflict and the intransience of the parties.  During his tenure, Morocco and the 
Polisario attended direct talks for the first time and signed the Houston Accords, which 
recommitted them to the UN settlement plan.  The death of King Hassan II in 1999 was 
first seen as potential opportunity for a softening of Morocco’s position, but little changed 
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under his son King Mohammed VI.107 In 2000, the United States increased military aid to 
Morocco, which had fallen after the Cold War ended and the ceasefire initiated.108  
The special role that U.S. policymakers envisioned for the U.S. in the resolution of 
this conflict was fueled by belief in American Exceptionalism, and in the dominance of the 
United States in a post-Cold War world. This is seen in the rhetoric of Congressman 
Dymally, in 1991, when he stated, “U.S. diplomacy is essential in ensuring that a true 
expression of self-determination takes place in the Western Sahara. Our continued strong 
advocacy of the peace plan is also important in reinforcing the stability of the region and 
advancing democracy in Africa.”109 Congressman Payne, speaking at the 1992 hearing on the 
UN peace plan, also articulated an exceptionalist conception of the United States. He 
asserted, “I believe that the United States as the world champion, the heavy-weight 
champion of democracy worldwide, has a moral responsibility to see that efforts toward self-
determination for the people of Western Sahara continue to move forward.”110 His 
optimistic expression of American exceptionalism was based on a self-narrative of 
democracy and morality.  
In practice, however, American actions were far less admirable.  United States 
policymakers expressed their support for a principled adherence to international law and the 
work of the international body, yet did not exercise the leverage they possessed over 
Morocco to ensure that the referendum was implemented. Not using the power it possessed 
for this purpose was a deliberate choice on the part of U.S. policymakers, who prioritized the 
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interests at stake in their relationship with Morocco over adherence to international norms 
or support for the marginalized Sahrawis.  
The U.S. self-narrative as promoter of democracy, human rights and self-
determination is demonstrated by the practice of releasing annual, country-specific, human 
rights reports. The gradual shifts in perceptions of the Sahrawi people and of the interests 
and meanings at stake in this conflict can be seen in a close reading of the State Department 
reports on human rights in the Western Sahara over the course of this post-Cold War 
decade.   
 
State Department Human Rights Reports 
The State Department releases Human Rights Reports on every country in the 
world, and the Western Sahara.  Though the United States recognizes Moroccan 
administrative control over the Western Sahara and has been adamant that it does not take a 
position on the eventual outcome of a referendum for self-determination, this disputed 
region is the only non-self-governing territory that is accorded a separate “Country Report” 
on human rights from the State Department.111  It is unclear why this is done, as in all other 
respects the U.S. has been very careful to deny the right of Western Sahara to exist as a 
separate state. Putting this interesting discrepancy aside, a look at the evolution of the 
language in the Western Sahara human rights reports reveals significant shifts in American 
perceptions and representations of the region during this period. 
The general template for the human rights reports remained constant, while tweaks 
in the wording reveal a more complicated picture of shifting and contested State Department 
perceptions of the region and the conflict. In the reports from the years 1993 to 1999, 
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important changes were made in the way that the initiation of the conflict was described and 
in the way that Polisario was depicted. This period also saw the release of more detailed 
information regarding Moroccan repression, disappearances of dissenters and a rise in civil 
society resistance to Morocco, which had been relatively absent from earlier reports. 
In 1993, the report noted that Morocco had “assumed administration” over the 
region, and used the Moroccan rhetoric of “unifying” the territory. It identified the Polisario 
as “Algerian-backed,” rather than as an indigenous independence movement.112 This 
language dates back to the Cold War framework of seeing the conflict as a regional power 
struggle that threatened the stability of the global power balance. An investigation into 
political bias in State Department Human Rights Reports determined, “The results indicate 
that the State Department’s reports, in comparison to those of Amnesty International, have 
at times favored US friends and trading partners while discriminating against its (perceived) 
leftist foes.”113 With respect the Western Sahara, Congress was also vocally concerned about 
the potential for political bias in favor of Morocco against the perceived ‘leftist’ group 
Polisario. In the 1992 hearing on the UN peace plan, Congressman Dymally pressed State 
Department official John Bolton to deny Congressional suspicions that the human rights 
report is biased. 
The Clinton administration embraced the rhetoric of human rights as integral to its 
foreign policy doctrine, an approach which may have influenced the shifts in the language 
used in human rights reports. By 1996, the Western Sahara report recognized that Morocco 
had claimed the territory forcefully using troops and settlers, and identified the Polisario as 
an “organization seeking independence for the region,” dropping the association with 
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Algeria as the defining characteristic of the rebel group.114 The evolution of the language in 
the human rights reports demonstrates a shift away from an uncritical acceptance of the 
Moroccan narrative on the subject, and the beginning of a recognition that multiple 
narratives existed.  
The reports accord more agency and legitimacy to both Polisario and to civil society 
resistors and human rights defenders (who began organizing in larger numbers during this 
period). Despite this shift, the reports shy away from apportioning blame for the delay of the 
referendum, citing “operational considerations.”115 While they recognize that human rights 
violations were perpetrated by Morocco, including forced disappearances, abrogation of due 
process, torture and repression of dissent, the reports fail to issue strong language 
condemning these abuses. Despite the fact that Congress had tied foreign aid to respect for 
human rights during the Carter administration, at no time was aid to Morocco restricted 
because of these reports of human rights violations. 
The practice of producing a report card on all other countries and conditioning 
foreign aid (or at least claiming the power to do so, though not implemented in this case) 
reinforces the self-perceived exceptionalism of the United States. This practice both asserts 
the authority of the U.S. to measure the human rights records of other countries, and 
assumes that human rights abuses are things that other governments do elsewhere. As 
political scientist Roxanne Doty notes, “promoting human rights became a practice whereby 
the US re-represented itself as a global hegemonic subject.”116 State officials and 
policymakers represented the US as a benevolent, paternalistic, and humanitarian power 
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innocent of any of the potentially violent and oppressive implications of its support for 
Morocco. 
The Clinton administration policy sought to frame the United States as a benevolent 
superpower. Rhetorically, at least, the U.S. demanded democracy, freedom and human rights 
for peoples around the world, and pledged to work towards achieving these principles in 
other places. The embrace of human rights and democracy both augmented America’s 
understanding of its own power, and legitimated its exercise of that power (whether or not 
the exercise of power was truly in the interest of human rights). The United States 
understood its ‘self’ as democratic, freedom-loving, and humanitarian. Doty writes that when 
these qualities were called into question by policies that went against principles, the rhetoric 
of human rights was intensified and hegemonic practices accelerated.117 When the policy did 
not match the principle, rather than a reevaluation of the policy, the effort went into 
reframing policy within the appropriate rhetoric of principles. 
The discourse of human rights is one of a set of interrelated discourses that U.S. 
statemakers circulate to perform and produce American power. U.S. self-representation as a 
defender of human rights must be seen in the context of its pursuit of national interests. 
While the Clinton period saw a renewed rhetorical emphasis on human rights, it also saw 
rearticulations of national interest and efforts to exert American power in complex and 
multidimensional ways. The concept of security, broadly understood, was a central thread 
that carried through articulations of interest, pursuit of policy and articulations of American 
values. In the realm of human rights, American national security also became the standard of 
measurement when it came to identifying issues of concern. Roxanne Doty asserts, “US 
security interests served as the nodal point around which the meaning of human rights was 
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constructed and that enabled the US to ignore violations (and even participate at least 
indirectly in violations) and still be capable of exercising international moral leadership.”118  
Doty’s hermeneutical argument claims that the meaning of what constituted a violation of 
human rights was understood through the lens of security-centric thinking.  This tendency of 
U.S. policymakers to identify human rights violations only when it is in their perceived 
security interest to do so is seen in the way that these human rights reports shift their 
representations of the Polisario in accordance with the new security environment, while 
continuing to gloss over Moroccan repression of Sahrawi political activists and other 
ongoing violence in the region. 
 
Securitizing the Sahara 
The end of the Cold War gave rise to new ways of thinking about the concept of 
security. The direct threat of mutual destruction and constant anti-Soviet posturing was 
suddenly off the table, and security had to be redefined and expanded to encompass 
contemporary threats. In thinking about the concept of security and the process of 
securitization, two dimensions must be considered. First, who or what group is being 
identified as deserving of protection, and second, who or what must they be protected from.  
During the Cold War, the divisions between the protected and the dangerous were fairly 
clear-cut. The ambiguously defined ‘free world’ was under threat and had to be protected. 
The Soviet Union and communist ideology were the ultimate enemies. The designation of an 
ideology as the threat served as a means of categorizing individuals, group, and states as 
enemies (a practice that would be redeployed in the fight against the ideologies of terrorism 
and Islamic fundamentalism later on). But for the most part, during the Cold War threats 
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were military in nature and consisted of one national group threatening another national 
group.  The threats were existential, because the outcome of the escalation of a U.S./USSR 
confrontation would be nuclear annihilation. 
In the context of discussions on the Western Sahara conflict, the concept of security 
was continually invoked, with overlapping meanings. The end of the Cold War instituted a 
shift away from perceiving national security primarily in terms of military security from 
direct, existential, threats. However, security remained a powerful governing concept for 
statemaking. The concept of security shifted to apply more broadly to the protection, growth 
and maintenance of American power. Defining security in terms of protecting American 
power meant that the concept could be applied to efforts at preserving the stability of the 
international order in which the United States dominated. The concept of security was also 
applied to efforts to preserve or promote American economic interests. The need to 
preserve the status quo of American dominance was branded as the need to protect and 
promote security and stability worldwide. The expansion of American power through neo-
imperial and hegemonic practices gave rise to new types of security threats.   
While the congressional hearings on the subject of the Western Sahara conflict 
throughout the 1990s focused on the progress of the UN peace plan, it was also clear that 
the United States was still thinking about the conflict in terms of its own security interests, 
broadly understood. The second half of the 1992 hearing on the status of the peace plan 
went into a closed executive session in order for Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton to 
express himself candidly to the congressional committee. Congressmen in the session note 
that this procedure is generally reserved for discussing issues directly related to national 
security, but it is unclear specifically what was redacted from the public record and how it 
affected ideas of national security. Bolton, representing a reticent State Department, also 
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prevented a U.S. officer serving with the MINURSO mission from testifying in the hearing, 
citing a UN policy. In response, the congressmen criticized Bolton for expressing mixed 
messages and saw him as unnecessarily obstructionist.119 The reluctance of State Department 
officials to provide satisfactory answers to congressional questioning is a demonstration of 
the bureaucratic culture of security and secrecy that had continued into the post-Cold War 
context. 
The conflict in the Western Sahara was re-represented as a threat in multiple ways. 
The three main security concerns that policymakers discussed with respect to this conflict 
were: economic security threatened by instability, military security affected by threats to 
American military prerogatives in Morocco, and the fact that the political security of the 
international order was put to the test by the irresolution of this conflict. The idea of 
‘security,’ as opposed to that of defense, formed a blanket concept that could be applied to a 
wide range of threats to US interests.120 During this period, policymakers moved away from 
the idea that the nation-state needed to be ‘secure’ against threats to its people and its very 
existence.  Instead, the increasingly hegemonic and neo-imperial practices of the United 
States created interests, places, and peoples who needed to be secured in order to protect 
and define the identity and power of the American State.  
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Instead of seeing the conflict over the Western Sahara as a potential site of proxy 
war between a Western (U.S.)-backed Morocco and a USSR-supported Algeria, policymakers 
began to emphasize a representation of the conflict as a threat to the model of collective 
security and peacekeeping embodied by the United Nations. One commentator noted, “At 
stake in this issue is not only the Sahrawi people's survival, but also the ability of the UN to 
resolve conflictual situations.”121 The continued intractability of the conflict became a sign of 
the failure of the United Nations and the international community to come through on the 
hopeful promises of liberal internationalism that policymakers had rhetorically embraced at 
the beginning of the decade. The (ir)resolution of the Western Sahara conflict became a 
measure of the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations, its fate a symbol of the 
flawed new international order lauded by political leaders. As one observer noted, “The 
apparent double standard and the failure to resolve the Western Sahara situation constitutes 
a serious and long-lasting blow to the Security Council as a credible force in upholding 
international law and resolving regional conflicts.”122 Thus the Western Sahara conflict itself, 
and its intractability, came to be seen as a threat to the U.S.-dominated United Nations 
institution, and an aberration in the international legal system.123  
The ongoing stalemate in the Western Sahara and the tension that it maintained 
between Morocco and other states of the Maghreb and Northern Africa was seen to pose a 
threat to the U.S. interest in economic openness. In Congressional discussions of the 
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Western Sahara, it was often portrayed as valuable for its “resource-rich” character.124  As a 
place in imperial geopolitical imaginations, the Western Sahara was a site of potential 
resources. However, the neoliberal vision of open borders open to the flow of capital was 
jeopardized by the irresolution of the conflict. The regional rivalry between Morocco and 
Algeria, which is rendered intractable by their respective positions on the Western Sahara 
region, impeded regional development and precluded the possibility of a regional economic 
integration. The border between Algeria and Morocco is closed and the regional institution 
of economic and political cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union, has remained largely 
defunct as a result of this ongoing conflict. The strategic importance of this region, the 
resources it controls and its location on the southern Mediterranean make the economic 
roadblocks unacceptable to U.S. and European interests.  
Historian Andrew Bacevich argues that the idea of economic openness and its 
central role in the preservation of American imperial power is not at all new, but rather a 
longstanding central tradition of United States foreign policy. Bacevich takes issue with the 
idea that the end of the Cold War constituted a true shift in U.S. foreign policy aims and 
practices. According to Bacevich, “By stipulating that American well-being depended not 
simply on developments at home but on the functioning of a global economy and on global 
adherence to certain norms, the architects of US policy expanded the scope of concerns 
falling under the rubric of security.”125 The governing concept of security was thus translated 
from a Cold War context into the policy imperatives of the “New World Order.” 
Bacevich argues that while U.S. foreign policy is often presented as ad hoc and in 
response to individual crises, the purpose of American policy is to preserve and, where 
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possible and conducive to U.S. interests, to expand the American Imperium by instituting a 
global order of democratic capitalism with the U.S. as its ultimate guarantor. While it is 
important to identify the deeper roots of the goals of economic openness and expansionist 
power, these imperatives were not dictated by a unitary state, but by the performance of 
discourses of power that produced the state as an effect. The Western Sahara, as an 
impediment to development and to regional economic integration, fell under the rubric of 
threat to a globalizing economic system concerned with the movement of capital across 
borders. The expansion of American imperial imperatives in the context of globalization 
meant that the threat the conflict posed to potential economic interests became an issue of 
‘security.’  
The concept of security is often paired with that of stability in discussions of the 
Western Sahara threat.  In 1997, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 245 
Concerning Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara.  The resolution was 
intended to express U.S. support for the negotiation process recently initiated by former 
Secretary of State James Baker. The resolution emphasized that, “continued turmoil in the 
region is contrary to U.S. interest.”126 Turmoil, instability and unrest were all characteristics 
that represented the Western Sahara as a danger. This characterization was reinforced in the 
1998 hearing in which State Department official Ronald Neumann testified that the conflict 
“has constituted an element of real and continuing potential instability, as well as a financial 
drain on the countries and peoples involved.”127 Neumann’s concern was with the effect of 
political instability on economic development and growth. The concerns expressed by 
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Neumann demonstrate that ideas about the political stability of friendly regimes and the 
goals economic progress and development were strongly linked in the minds of 
policymakers. In his words on the conflict, Neumann is clear that “we would like to avoid 
risk to stability and to our interest.”128 The drive to secure ‘stability’ was inextricably linked to 
ideas of economic development and trade. 
Speaking in a 2000 Congressional hearing on the subject of the Western Sahara, State 
Department official Allen Keiswetter relied heavily on the concept of stability to argue that a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict was in the interest of the United States.  He noted that 
continued conflict posed constraints on the development of opportunities in the region and 
its potential to threaten economic liberalizing trends, suggesting that a resolution would offer 
the “prospect of strengthening political, economic, and commercial cooperation for the 
betterment of all concerned.”129 By his invocation, the United States, Morocco, Algeria, the 
Sahrawi, and Southern Europe were all implicated in the category of those ‘concerned’ with 
the development of the region. Rather than advocating for adherence to international law 
(which required an act of self-determination), the use of the concept of stability enabled 
policymakers to maintain a status quo approach that advocated peaceful resolution through 
negotiation. 
As the momentum for the referendum diminished in the late 1990s, policymakers in 
the United States began to shift away from the emphasis on the referendum process as the 
only means of resolving the conflict. After failing to implement the long stalled referendum, 
Special Envoy Baker turned to the discourse of autonomy as a third option for resolving the 
mutually exclusive positions of Morocco and Polisario. This approach reflects the desire of 
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the United States and the United Nations to maintain the stability of the region, at the cost 
of the human rights of the Sahrawi people, particularly that of self-determination.  
The inconsistency between the professed commitment of the United States to 
human rights, democracy, and self-determination and its selective application of those 
principles can be better understood through a critical analysis of the process of statecraft.  
These discrepancies are not simply a matter of the tendency of policymakers to express one 
policy publically and conduct another. It was not merely a clash between the interests of 
realism and the idealism of liberalism. It is more helpful to first interrogate the meanings of 
the conceptual assumptions that government the practice of policymaking to understand 
how certain discourses informed and shaped the thinking processes and material actions, or 
inactions, of U.S. policymakers. This chapter has attempted to follow Roxanne Doty’s 
prescription to think about the categories and terms that policymakers used, to see how 
these categories were constituted and how they excluded alternative interpretations or 
practices. 130 This approach made clear the limitations of foreign policy thinking about the 
Western Sahara conflict.  By imagining the conflict as embedded at the margins of a global 
political order, policymakers were able to prioritize their perceived concerns about stability 
and security and to overlook the self-determination struggles of the Sahrawi. Imagining the 
Western Sahara as a source of danger to U.S. interests allowed policymakers to pursue 
policies that enabled Morocco’s continued occupation. 
The geopolitical lens that U.S. policymakers applied to the Western Sahara enabled 
the erasure and obfuscation of the Sahrawi narrative of their struggle for independence, as 
well as the narrative of their pacification through the invasive and oppressive actions of the 
Moroccan state.  Michael Shapiro noted in 1990 that, “what is not registered in the modern 
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geopolitical discourse is the historical process of struggle in which areas and peoples have 
been pacified, named, homogenized, and fixed in modern international space.”131 The 
Sahrawi people have been characterized as dangerous to the geopolitical order, including the 
stability and economic development of the region, and the credibility of the United Nations 
legal system. Constrained by these representations, the Western Sahara and the Sahrawi 
people are an example of a place and a people whose process of struggle was overtaken by a 
geopolitical and imperial process of naming and fixing people in the contemporary world 
order.  U.S policymakers understood the end of the Cold War to signify the emergence of a 
world order dependent on cooperation through U.S.-dominated international organizations.  
In this new world order, the Western Sahara was a potential danger, a place whose deviance 
from the established order of nation-states was perceived as a threat to the hegemon from 
the distant periphery.  
As will emerge in the following chapter, the Western Sahara and the broader Sahara-
Sahel region was increasingly scripted as a place of insecurity and threat as the fight against 
terrorism took on a central role in American foreign policy. In a 1996 speech titled 
“American Security in a Changing World,” President Bill Clinton articulated a vision of 
American power and of its threats that foreshadowed the discourses of the War on Terror.132  
Painting the United States as the “indispensable nation,” he called upon the U.S. to lead 
where its “interests and values” demand it. In addition to his rhetorical display of confidence 
in American exceptionalism and imperialistic right to rule, Clinton emphasizes the 
immediacy and the constancy of threats to America and the American people. While 
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simultaneously advocating for breaking down the walls between domestic and foreign policy, 
Clinton articulates a strong distinction between the ‘America’ that must be protected and the 
deviant ‘Other’ that it must be protected from. Threats to security, which he identified as 
terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and closed markets, are constant and seek to undermine the very idea of 
America. Clinton’s depiction is not unique, though the rhetoric is fitted to suit the times.  
This speech plays into a larger history of discursive practices through which leaders of the 
state articulate, and thus construct, the identity of the state through the practice of scripting 
narrative of insecurity onto other places.133 
Over the course of the next decade, accelerated by the events of 9/11 and new 
security imperatives, U.S. policy became intertwined with increasingly imperialistic efforts to 
control international spaces. In the new security environment, Morocco became an ‘essential 
ally’ in the fight against terrorism, a shift that further relegated the Western Sahara to the 
status of potential threat. The chapter that follows will examine how the new security 
imperatives in the discourse of the War on Terror affected the scripting of the Western 
Sahara as a place in American geopolitical imaginations.  
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Chapter Four: The War on Terror 
 “Since 2012, a coup in Mali, and the 2011 overthrow of Ghadafi in Libya, the security in the Sahel has gotten worse, 
not better. At a time when the United States, as it is said by the administration, pivots to the East, we cannot leave 
behind our obligation to the continent of Africa.  Some might think that this is not a problem for the United States, but 
they are wrong…what happens in the Sahel is directly related to our regional interests and security here at home. The 
prevention of an attack on our homeland and on our Western allies by radical Islamic extremists is a challenge and will 
be for the foreseeable future… they seek to destroy us and kill us indiscriminately. This is the real world. This is not a 
fiction story.” 
~Congressman Ted Poe, 2013 Congressional Hearing on the Growing Crisis in the Sahel Region 
 
The conflict over the Western Sahara has progressed little over the last decade. The 
stalemate status quo is in large part due to the intransience of the negotiating parties and the 
refusal of their allies to pressure them to make compromises. The United States has the 
power to pressure its ally Morocco to make concessions and to push for stronger action 
from the UN Security Council to implement a referendum on the status of the territory. 
Rather than use its power to advance a just resolution to this conflict in accordance with 
international law, the United States has instead expanded its own role in efforts to secure this 
region from perceived threats. These efforts, which combine imperialistic mechanisms of 
exerting U.S. power in economic, military and diplomatic realms, are facilitated by the 
discourse of terrorism and the specific forms of securitization that these discourses justify 
and require. The Western Sahara conflict, at the margins of global power politics, is once 
again being brought into broader discourses of security and mapped as a place of concern 
for the United States. The representations of the Western Sahara conflict within U.S. policy 
circles became increasingly subject to and embedded within the prevailing discourses of 
terrorism, criminality and insecurity in the decade following September 11th, 2001.  Since 
9/11, the Western Sahara region, conflict and peoples have been scripted into a cartography 
of potential violence represented by the ‘arc of instability.’  Coined by the Bush 
administration, the ‘arc of instability’ mapped a broad region stretching from central Asia to 
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the Atlantic Coast of Africa.134 The discursive location of the Western Sahara within this 
emerging narrative of potential sites of terrorism has helped to facilitate the acceleration of 
U.S. military activity and securitization of the Sahara-Sahel region.  
Over the course of the decade, the U.S./Morocco economic and military 
relationships have strengthened, former Secretary of State James Baker resigned his role as 
negotiator in 2004, and U.S. officials have embraced the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy plan 
(which denies the right of self-determination to the Sahrawi people) as the best path towards 
resolution. No actual progress has been made in negotiation efforts to resolve the conflict, 
despite the efforts of the current Special Envoy, former U.S. official Christopher Ross. Civil 
society resistance within the Moroccan-controlled territory has grown significantly, as has 
Moroccan repression of dissent. Large-scale nonviolent protests were met by brutal 
repression in 1999, 2005 and 2010, yet MINURSO, the UN peacekeeping mission 
established in the Western Sahara nearly 25 years ago, still lacks the power to monitor and 
report on human rights violations.  Within the United States, the conflict is nearly invisible, 
except upon the rare occasion that it comes up for debate in a congressional hearing or 
attracts the fleeting attention of American media. When it is discussed, the Western Sahara 
conflict is embedded in the context of broader conversations about insecurity, instability and 
counterterrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region. A close look at these conversations reveals both 
new and recycled representations of the Western Sahara articulated by U.S. policymakers. 
Often, these representations recall Cold War era fears about the region’s susceptibility to 
anti-American ideology, though the emphasis is now on terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism rather than the fear of communism. 
                                                
134 Note that the arrows on the map of the ‘arc of instability,’ see Appendix, point directly to the Western 
Sahara as the edge of this ‘arc’ that traverses the Middle East and North Africa.  
81 
James Baker III, who as Secretary of State presided over the end of the Cold War 
and as the UN Special Envoy to the Western Sahara saw the beginnings of the War on 
Terror, spoke to a question on the effect of post-9/11 terrorism in a 2004 interview after his 
resignation as Special Envoy. Baker noted that the “problem the United States has here is 
because it has two countries that are cooperating with it in the war on terror with which it 
wants to stay on good relations — both Algeria and Morocco” and continued on to say “So 
that’s why the 101st airborne isn’t going to go in and require self-determination in the 
Western Sahara.”135  In essence, Baker’s assertion indicates two central, and usually 
unquestioned, principles of conventional foreign policymaking. First, that the United States 
privileges the interests of state and state actors above the needs and interests of peoples. 
This statist bias helped to inform a view of this conflict as one between Morocco and 
Algeria, a common representation that delegitimizes and obscures narratives of the Sahrawi 
people’s struggle for self-determination. And second, that intervention, military or otherwise, 
by the United States to secure human rights is contingent on the U.S. perceived security 
interests in specific region rather than a desire to protect rights. While it may seem obvious 
that foreign policy making is primarily concerned protecting the interests of the State, it is 
important to understand how specific place, events and peoples are scripted by the perceived 
interests of the United States and how these representations foreclosure other modes of 
interpretation and action.   
 This chapter will trace the emergence of new discursive themes and the recurrence of 
earlier themes in the representational practices seen in congressional hearings, State 
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Department statements and human rights reports on the Western Sahara conflict. I 
emphasize the effort to locate the Western Sahara within a securitized region increasingly 
subject to the imperialistic expansion of American military power. While I argue that the 
Western Sahara has been scripted into the emerging discourse of terrorism, I try not to lose 
sight of the voices within U.S. policy circles and on the ground in the Western Sahara 
territory that resisted this characterization. Certain discursive conditions of possibility 
enabled the construction of the Western Sahara as a place of concern for the United States. 
Recurrent themes include implicating the Western Sahara conflict in narratives of the 
potential for terrorism in the region, accusations of criminal activity (mainly smuggling) and 
irregular migration facilitated by the ‘ungoverned [and empty] spaces’ and ‘porous borders’ 
of the region, and complaints about the conflict as an impediment to regional economic 
cooperation. I begin with a brief outline of the representations of this conflict in 
Congressional hearings between 2001 and 2014, and proceed to a discussion of the themes 
that emerge in them. A close reading of the State Department human rights reports on the 
region helps to reveal continuities and inconsistencies with earlier representations of the 
conflict. I conclude the chapter with an exploration of the material effects of these discursive 
practices evident in the neo-imperial encroachment of American economic and military 
power in the broader region of the Sahara-Sahel.  
 The writers of an introduction to a new journal Critical Studies on Security argue that the 
Cold War era thinking about security as military and state-centric has continued to inform 
alternative conceptions of security that have been developed to try to explain the needs of a 
new world order. They assert that the initiation of the Global War on Terror “dramatically 
reinforced the significance of security, which had been seemingly on the wane since 1989, 
but the notion of security that came with it was quite different from that which had come 
83 
before.”136 The new form of security, according to these scholars, is a much more 
“expansive, fluid and uncertain concept.” New modes of thinking about security are being 
implemented to maintain the distinctions between the state and its threats, and are deployed 
to justify new modes of power.  As much as these new modes of security and power claim to 
be new and modern, they are still rooted in militarized and state-centric discourses. 
 In the years since the initiation of the so-called “War on Terror,” U.S. policymakers 
have focused their geopolitical gaze on the broader Middle East and North African (MENA) 
region. The geopolitical gaze of policymakers was colored by racialized fears of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the discourse of terrorism, which contributed to the scripting of the 
MENA region as a site as a site of instability and danger. The events of September 11, 2001 
showed that the U.S. ‘homeland’ was susceptible to global threats. The concept of the 
homeland enabled the drive to secure neo-imperial interests to be rebranded as a national 
security concern. Suddenly, the nation-state itself once again came under attack from 
infiltrating outside forces that had to be secured against. In the global drama performed by 
U.S. statemakers, the binaries of domestic and foreign implied by the concept of the 
homeland delineated the boundaries of an American State.137 American Studies scholar Amy 
Kaplan, in her text Homeland Insecurities, is attentive to the relationship between securing the 
homeland against the encroachment of foreign terrorists and enforcing national power 
abroad. Kaplan characterizes this relationship as part of the process of producing the 
modern American Empire, in which discourses of security dominated by the concept of 
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terrorism are deployed to justify assertions of American power in the margins of global 
political space.  
In the era of the War on Terror, American power produced by the performative 
discourses of statemakers is rooted in the identification of external threats. The State that is 
produced and sustained by these new and recycled discourses of security is one that is 
simultaneously bounded and expansive. The Homeland Security State expanded conceptions 
of who and what presented a danger to the United States, as well as who and what needed to 
be secured. Within the emerging narratives of the homeland security era, U.S. policymakers 
valued Morocco as a moderate Islamic ally and partner in counterterrorism efforts. It was 
within this context that the Western Sahara conflict was discussed by U.S. policymakers.   
 
Congressional Hearings  
 In the first decade of the 21st century, only one congressional hearing was held on 
specifically to explore the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. In 2005 the House 
Committee on International Relations held a hearing called “Getting to Yes: Resolving the 
30-year conflict over the Western Sahara.” However the issue of the Western Sahara conflict 
also arose in a 2004 hearing on the proposed U.S./Morocco Free Trade Act, in a 2007 
hearing on U.S. policy challenges in North Africa, in a 2009 hearing on counterterrorism in 
the Sahel, in a 2013 hearing on terrorism in the Sahel after the U.S. intervention in Benghazi, 
Libya, in another 2013 hearing called “Growing Crisis in the Sahel,” and an April 2014 
hearing on U.S. policy towards Morocco. As is clear from this list, the Western Sahara 
conflict was viewed as a contributing factor to a perceived increase in crises and terrorist 
dangers emerging from a broad region of northwest Africa. In these hearings, a variety of 
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outside experts, State Department representatives and congressional leaders expressed 
differing, and sometimes conflicting, representations of the Western Sahara conflict.   
 In the 2004 debate on the congressional floor regarding the U.S. Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement several pro-Sahrawi Congressmen brought the conversation around to 
how this agreement would affect U.S. policy towards the Western Sahara conflict. Led by 
Congressman Joe Pitts, these voices sought to clarify that the trade agreement would not 
apply to any goods or resources produced in the Western Sahara. The U.S. Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA), a product of several years of negotiation and intense involvement 
of Morocco’s cohort of Washington lobbyists, eliminated trade barriers for exports to the 
United States and strengthened economic ties between the two countries. The FTA was 
perceived as an important means of integrating into the global economy a region that was of 
“critical concern” to the United States.138 The language of the bill was extremely supportive 
of Morocco, emphasizing its efforts at modernization and moderateness, and its text did not 
make any distinction about the Western Sahara until Congressman McDermott, Pitts, Towns 
and Crane raised objections. As a result, official letters from the Ways and Means Committee 
and the US Office of the Trade Representative to the House of Representatives were 
entered into the record to explicitly state that the FTA does not apply to Western Sahara as 
the U.S. does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over it. They explained, “The FTA will 
cover trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized internationally, and will 
not include Western Sahara.” The concern of pro-Saharawi Congressmen was that the trade 
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agreement would help Morocco benefit from the resources extracted in the illegally-occupied 
Western Sahara territory.139  
 The small cohort of pro-Sahrawi Congressmen were combating an emerging 
representation of the Western Sahara as a site of terrorism.  Congressman Joe Pitts was 
particularly concerned about this representation. He took the floor to state, “I just want to 
clarify the statement about the people of Western Sahara. Earlier today someone said that 
the Sahrawis are terrorists. I take exception to this remark, as the people of Western Sahara, 
and like many others in North Africa and the Middle East, have actually tried to peacefully 
solve the conflict. The State Department does not consider the people of Western Sahara to 
be terrorists. It is a misstatement. It is wrong. It is unproductive in our fight against 
terrorism to suggest that they are, and our own State Department does not believe the 
people of Western Sahara are terrorists.”140 To further debunk this misleading 
representation, Pitts submitted several documents to the Congressional Record on the 
subject, including the 1974 ICJ opinion, the text of the failed Baker plan, and a set of 
sympathetic newspaper articles. 
 While this challenge to the prevailing narrative was exceedingly important, it did not 
change the course of the Free Trade Agreement and its effect on the region.  Trade between 
the U.S. and Morocco has expanded exponentially since the adoption of the FTA. 141 The 
FTA did not stop Morocco from profiting from the phosphate mines and commercial 
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fishing of Western Sahara, and has not prevented the Moroccan government from issuing 
contracts to U.S. and French companies for oil exploration in the region.142 Instead, the FTA 
laid the foundation for increased economic cooperation between the United States and 
Morocco, at the expense of the Sahrawi people’s rights to land and resources.  
In subsequent congressional hearings, the divisions between those sympathetic to the 
Sahrawi cause and those closely tied to Moroccan lobbyists became starkly apparent. 
Congressional voices on both sides of the conflict imposed U.S.-centric representational 
tropes onto this region and its people. Representations of the Sahrawi people and their cause 
were fueled by and helped to further American narratives of the region, which allowed little 
room for the expression of Sahrawi voices. On the one hand, the Sahrawi are represented 
using the language of Western ideals of peace and democracy. For example, Congressman 
Pitts is careful to present the Saharawi in the terms that appeal to US policymakers. He calls 
them “peaceful, pro-Western, pro-democracy people.” This deliberate usage of the language 
of democracy reflects his awareness that this form of representation was necessary to gain 
political sympathy and support from U.S. policymakers.   
                                                
142 Speculation about the possibility of discovering oil in the Western Sahara or offshore in its territorial waters 
has long been a specter haunting U.S. interest in the region.  In the early years of this conflict the possibility of 
oil was discussed, likely heightened by the oil crises of the 1970s. In the last decade, Morocco has issues 
licenses to French energy company Total and American companies Kerr McGee and Kosmos to explore for oil 
in the Western Sahara. However, according to a 2002 legal opinion by the United Nations counsel Hans Corell, 
any attempt to exploit the resources of the region must be done in accordance with the will of the Sahrawi 
people and international law. Led by a Norwegian solidarity group, the Western Sahara Resource Watch, 
activists have attempted to resist the exploitation of resources, and succeeded in convincing U.S. company Kerr 
McGee to let its permit expire in 2006. However, U.S. company Kosmos is going ahead with plans to explore 
for offshore oil in the Western Sahara, bolstered by a dubious claim that the discovery of oil in the region will 
push forward the negotiation process. Invoking a comment made by James Baker upon his resignation from 
the role of Special Envoy, the company claims that the discovery of oil in this region “might even make it 
easier” to resolve the conflict.  In the 2004 PBS interview cited by Kosmos, Baker vehemently denied that oil 
was a reason he had been personally interested in the conflict, and was reluctant to admit that the possibility of 
oil was one reason the United States was interested in the conflict. He does suggest, however, that the 
discovery of oil and the presence of terrorist activity might reenergize and reprioritize efforts to resolve the 
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Being democratic and peaceful (as measured by a U.S.-centric standard) was required 
for the Sahrawi cause to be recognized as politically legitimate. Supportive policymakers and 
human rights groups make a consistent effort to use this language, and to emphasize 
nonviolence and the democratic nature of Sahrawi society both in the occupied territory and 
in the refugee camps. This is strategy is also seen in the language of the Robert F. Kennedy 
Center, which advocates for Sahrawi human rights and lobbies Congressmen and officials. In 
2012, a statement in the Congressional Record submitted by Congressman Frank Wolf 
emphasizes the language of civil society, independence, free speech and defense of human 
rights.143 While the attempt to script the Sahrawi struggle into a Western narrative of 
democracy strips independent agency and local specificity from the cause of Sahrawi people, 
it is far less violent and detrimental than the competing narrative emerging in U.S. discourse.    
At the other end of the spectrum, Congressmen with close ties to Moroccan 
lobbying groups, such as Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, used the 
language of guerrillas, criminals, and terrorists to represent the Sahrawi people. Often, their 
representations drew on Cold War-era characterizations to delegitimize the Sahrawi cause 
while deploying the discourse of terrorism to demonize the Sahrawi people.  Congressman 
Lincoln Diaz-Balart’s statement in the 2005 hearing on the resolution of the conflict dwells 
on the Polisario’s association with Cuba and Libya, asserting, “Polisario counts among its 
closest friends tyrants such as Castro and Ghadafi…Sahrawi young people who have been 
taken by the Polisario from their families at a young age and shipped off for decades-long 
indoctrination in Libya or Cuba…Thousands of young people are in indoctrination schools 
in Cuba at this very moment, separated from their families and subjected to vile forms of 
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anti-American indoctrination.”144 The association of the Polisario with villanized enemies of 
the United States helps to locate the group firmly within the category of dangerous enemy.  
The supposed abduction of Sahrawi children for the purposes of anti-American 
indoctrination has been discredited by scholars of the region, yet is a recurring concern of 
pro-Moroccan congressmen.145 This kind of rhetoric brings to light the connections between 
the Cold War lens and the lens of the War on Terror in the discourses that emerged during 
this period.  
Congressman Diaz-Balart (who has close contact with the Moroccan American 
Center for Policy and several other lobby firms paid by the Moroccan government)146 linked 
together the conflict over the Western Sahara and ideas of U.S. security. He asserted, “I 
believe that Morocco’s insistence upon its territorial integrity in the Western Sahara is 
critically important, not only for the national security of Morocco, but also for the security of 
the United States and of our European allies.” An interesting point to note is that while 
Diaz-Balart classified the type of threat that the Western Sahara presented as a national 
security threat the Morocco, the type of threat that the Western Sahara posed to the United 
States is less clear. The conflict in the Western Sahara was certainly perceived as a threat to 
the U.S., but the type of threat that it posed was not necessarily national in nature. As the 
texts examined over the course of this chapter demonstrate, the form of threat posed by the 
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Western Sahara conflict was more ambiguous and relied on more abstract concepts of 
security.  
In a later statement in the Congressional Record in 2010, Diaz-Balart’s rhetorical 
display of Cold War fears embellished with the discourse of terrorism reached an apex. He 
stated:  
Let us never forget that a make-believe, an illusory, a fake microstate in Northern 
Africa would be led by a Castro-Cuban-formed political class which would constitute 
a minority of the population even within the fake microstate, but would control it 
through Castro-style repression. Let us never forget that such a microstate would 
serve as a focal point of regional instability and destabilization, as well as an exporter 
of terrorism.147  
The threat, then, that the conflict posed was not to the nation, but to the ideas of 
stability, to the security of the homeland from terrorism, and to traditional ideas about 
political legitimacy, informed by an anti-Cuban framework reminiscent of the Cold War era    
In reference to Diaz-Balart’s narrative of the Western Sahara conflict, Congressman 
Sherman reinforced the imperatives of security that the conflict supposedly posed for the 
United States in the 2005 hearing. He asserted, “the Polisario has allied itself with those who 
have sought to kill Americans, who have sought to wage war against our country and have 
sought to disrupt the world… it is a choice between a group that espouses terrorism and 
allies itself with those who wage war on America versus a country that has sought to ally 
itself with America.”148 In accordance with the Bush administration’s line that “you are either 
with us or against us” in the fight against terrorism, this narrative presents a binary choice 
for U.S. policy on the Western Sahara conflict. In this presentation, there is no choice to be 
made; the United States must exert its influence in favor of its counterterrorism ally 
Morocco.  
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It is important not to overlook the role that Morocco played in helping to represent 
itself as a staunch U.S. ally in the War on Terror and to frame the Western Sahara conflict 
within the discourse of terrorism. Morocco promoted allegations about the involvement of 
disaffected Sahrawis in instances of terrorism and political conflict in Algeria, Mali and Libya 
during this decade, and actively promulgated the idea that the irresolution of the Western 
Sahara conflict made the region susceptible to infiltration by Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb. Morocco’s official narrative and well-paid lobbying efforts in Washington 
encouraged the dual narrative that the Western Sahara conflict was spilling over into the rest 
of the Sahara-Sahel region and that the conflicts within the region were spilling over into the 
Western Sahara. The lobbying done on behalf of the Moroccan government has been 
substantial. Since 2007, for example, the kingdom has spent roughly $20 million on lobbying 
U.S. policymakers.149 The role of Moroccan lobbying is not to be underestimated in thinking 
about how U.S. policymakers see the conflict. 
A major effect of the successful lobbying work of agents representing the Moroccan 
government was the gradual shift away from any real commitment on the part of the U.S. to 
the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Enabled by discourses of security and the 
allegations of threat encouraged by Moroccan agents, U.S. policymakers moved away from 
the possibility the Western Sahara could ever become independent through an act of self-
determination, and instead threw their weight behind the Morocco-proposed autonomy 
plan. In part, this shift was also enabled by the ambiguity of the concept of self-
determination and its place in the international legal system.150 Testifying in a 2005 hearing 
on the subject, State Department official Gordon Gray articulated this ambiguity and the 
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incipient shift in US policy. Rather than repeat the strategy of earlier State Department 
officials who rhetorically affirmed the principle of self-determination and skirted around its 
application in practice, Gray’s comment attempted to redefine the concept of self-
determination to fit U.S. policy. He noted, “Self-determination is a very loaded phrase. I 
view self-determination as a process and that is why it is so important for the Government 
of Morocco to present an autonomy plan so that we can have more specifics on how the 
Sahrawi people will be able to have more control over their future than they have now.”151  
This formulation of the concept of self-determination did not allow for the possibility of 
independence. Instead, policymakers framed the Moroccan Autonomy proposal as sufficient 
enough to satisfy the legal obligation to an act of expression of the people’ will. 
In the year 2007, several events converged with respect to the Western Sahara 
conflict that enabled policymakers to elevate the status of the conflict to a counterterrorism 
concern and to reorient the discourse away from any mention of the possibility of 
independence for the Sahrawi people. In 2007, Morocco proposed an Autonomy Plan for 
the Western Sahara as the starting point for any further negotiations and which did not 
include the possibility of independence. A group of former U.S. policymakers led by former 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright submitted a letter to President Bush expressing support 
for the Autonomy Plan. The letter asserted that, “Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and 
Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. 
Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, 
and economic integration efforts in the region.”152 Autonomy was thus substituted for the 
right to self-determination or independence of the Sahrawi people. 
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Speaking in the 2007 hearing, State Department representative David Welch called 
the Autonomy Plan “serious and credible,” using the language that would be used to express 
the official U.S. line over the next 6 years. Welch went on to say that “Unresolved, the crisis 
leaves approximately 90,000 Sahrawi people languishing in refugee camps near Tindouf, 
Algeria and the territory a potentially attractive safehaven for terrorist planning or 
activity.”153 The ‘potential’ of terrorism was excuse enough for the U.S. to designate the 
Western Sahara as a zone of threat, and for it to play a part in the increased militarization of 
the region through programs such as AFRICOM (established in 2007) and the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (which replaced the Pan Sahel Inititative in 2007). 
 These programs, which will be explored further in this chapter, identify the main 
terrorist threat in the Sahara-Sahel region as the group now known as Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Algerian organization Groupe salafiste pour la predication et le 
combat (GSPC) rebranded itself as AQIM in 2007. Following these events, the 2007 House 
Hearing on U.S. Policy Challenges in North Africa centered on the role that the resolution 
of the Western Sahara conflict could play in helping to achieve U.S. counterterrorism goals 
in the region. Chairman Tom Lantos set the stage for this connection in his opening 
statement, where he asserted: “The United States has a major stake in the stability of North 
Africa. Al-Qaeda and other terror groups are expanding rapidly their presence in the region. 
It is imperative that we settle the Western Saharan issue as part of the effort to assure that 
the region does not become a major terrorism breeding ground.”154 According to the views 
expressed by many congressmen, there is a direct connection between the threat of AQIM, 
and the irresolution of the Western Sahara conflict.  
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The phrase security and stability fueled by the discourse on terrorism in the region 
became the recurring trope used to deflect attention away from the issues of self-
determination and human rights. The geopolitical gaze of U.S. policymakers charted the 
Western Sahara as empty space that needed to be stabilized and secured. Representations of 
the region perpetuated by U.S. policymakers centered on the vulnerability of this territory, 
both in the sense of the potential threats that it might produce or harbor and in the sense of 
its potential as a site of resource extraction. The Western Sahara region was located by the 
discourse of policymakers within a region characterized by its potential threat to stability as 
an “ungoverned space.” The discourse of un- or under- governed spaces emerged in the 
post-9/11 context as a way to characterize the region as dangerous, and to produce it as a 
liminal site suited for the exercise of imperial and colonial power.  
Policymakers located the Western Sahara conflict within the discourses of failed 
states, porous borders, and empty space in the broader Sahara-Sahel region. These 
characterizations were seen as features that facilitated the infiltration and growth of terrorist 
activity. In the 2009 hearing on Counterterrorism in the Sahel, Earl Gast of USAID 
expressed a widely held concern that challenges to state power “facilitates the emergence of 
‘ungoverned,’ ‘undergoverned,’ ‘misgoverned,’ or ‘poorly governed’ spaces, which, in turn 
may provide opportunities for violent extremist groups.”155 The small per capita population 
of the region, its desert topography, and the discounting of nomadic ways of life in Western 
geopolitical discourse contributed to the scripting of the territory as empty. The Western 
Sahara conflict was then narrated as an improperly governed space, replete with the potential 
for terrorism.   
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 A PBS interviewer in 2004 asked James Baker if the terrorist activity in southern 
Sahara could spill over into Western Sahara, “because the U.S. army was talking in April this 
year about Muslim extremists moving into these massive open spaces saying that they are as 
elusive there as if they were out at sea.”156  Here we see the surfacing of the fear of 
ungoverned space. To the interviewer, Baker responded, “It’s conceivable…There are great 
vast, vacant open spaces in very, very harsh environments.”157 This affirmation gave 
credence to policymakers’ fears about the supposedly ‘empty’ region, fears which enabled 
(and demanded) the acceleration of the securitization of the Sahara-Sahel region over the 
next few years.  
For U.S. policymakers, ungoverned space became an identifier of potential threats to 
national, or homeland, security. Why are policymakers afraid of ungoverned space? In a 
world of nation-states, land or space which is not territorialized (subject to state power) is a 
threat to the defining characteristic of the state as sovereign within its borders. What are the 
linkages between ungoverned space, porous borders and terrorism? The physical, legal, and 
social borders of the nation-state are defined primarily by that which is excluded by the 
process of delineation. The state is constituted by bordering practices, that define who/what 
is included and who/what is seen as a threat to the state. U.S. policymakers use the concept 
of terrorism to refer to definitively anti-state threats to the homeland. Terrorism, is as it is 
used by U.S. policymakers, refers to “politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups.”158 The state sees non-state actors, or 
‘subnational’ groups who deploy violence for their political aims, as existential threats to the 
                                                
156 Baker, James. Interview with Mishal Husain. “Former U.S. Secretary of State and former Personal Envoy of 
the U.N. Secretary General to Western Sahara, James A. Baker III discusses the protracted conflict in Western 
Sahara with host Mishal Husain.” Public Broadcasting Station (PBS). August 2004. 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/sahara-marathon/interview-james-a-baker-iii/873/ 
157 Ibid. 
158 From U.S. Code Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f(d). This definition of terrorism excludes the possibility of state 
terrorism.   
96 
state. The problem that terrorism poses for the state is not the possibility of destruction of 
the state but, rather, a challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence.  
 Terrorism is not the only threat posed by ungoverned space that U.S. policymakers are 
concerned about in the Sahara region. Policymakers fear that porous borders lend 
themselves to criminal activity, specifically the smuggling of goods and people.159 They are 
concerned about both the drug and cigarette smuggling industry in the Sahel and the illegal 
migration of sub-Saharans northwards. The U.S. and the European Union are concerned 
about drugs and sub-Saharan migrants entering the European Union through the Sahara. 
Morocco functions as a gateway to the EU and thus is employed as an administrator of EU 
migration policy. From this perspective, the vast ungoverned spaces of the Western Sahara 
are seen as amenable to the movement of illegal goods such as drugs and weapons, as well as 
the illegal movement of humans. 
 Polisario has been discursively tied to a ring of smuggling activity, though little 
concrete proof has been reported. In a 2013 hearing, former Georgetown professor Nii 
Akuetteh asserted that “In the triangle between Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, Sahrawi 
networks-often with the direct involvement of officials in the Polisario movement, which 
seeks independence for Western Sahara-trade subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian 
aid southward and cigarettes northward to Algeria and Morocco.”160 However, these 
allegations are disputed. Some of the smuggling activity in the region is conducted by 
individuals who may have links to Polisario, but the organization itself has no involvement.  
 The threat of ungoverned space is narrated using specific security-related 
buzzwords—namely drugs, arms, migrants and terrorism. These terms contribute to a 
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particular view of the region that has influenced the way that policymakers respond to the 
ongoing conflict over the Western Sahara. The use of these terms to represent events in the 
Western Sahara and the surrounding region reflect the way that, as political scientist David 
Campbell writes, certain modes of representation “crystallize around referents marked as 
dangers.”161 These terms, regarded as referents of danger, produce a demand for a state 
security response that takes the form of international policing.  
The fear of ungoverned space and the absence of authoritative state power reflect 
the statist bias of the lens that US policymakers use to view the world. Congressmen express 
fears about the vast spaces of the Sahara-Sahel becoming a “terrorist Wild West,”162 and 
support policies that seek to enhance the capacity of state actors to control the space.  
AFRICOM’s website states that its “core mission of assisting African states and regional 
organizations to strengthen their defense capabilities better enables Africans to address their 
security threats and reduces threats to U.S. interests.”163 The emphasis on securing existing 
states, rather than people, communities, or citizens, demonstrates the statist and militarist 
focus of the U.S.’s engagement with Africa.  For example, in a 2013 hearing, Representative 
Sherman asked experts at a congressional hearing “what are the links between AQIM and 
the Polisario? What are we doing to disrupt those links, and what should we be doing to help 
allies like Morocco deal with AQIM-aided organizations?”164 The immediate emphasis was 
on supporting state actors in opposition to non-state and potentially destabilizing actors.   
 This statist bias is concerning because of the way that it silences the legitimate political 
aims of non-state actors and marginalized communities within or outside the state. The 
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tendency for policymakers to express faith in state actors over their political opponents is 
seen in the way that policymakers like Chairman Tom Lantos who, despite years of evidence 
to the contrary, blamed Polisario for obstructing the resolution of the conflict.165 Lantos, for 
whom the Congressional Human Rights Caucus was named after his death in 2008, 
resolutely declared in the 2007 hearing, “peace has been summarily rejected by the rebel 
Polisario Front in favor of arid refugee camps and guerilla ambushes.”166 In this statement, 
the term ‘guerrilla’ dismissed the Polisario as a non-state actor whose use of force for 
political aims is delegitimized.  
 While U.S. Congressmen and State Department officials expressed a range of 
representations of the Western Sahara conflict, nearly all of these representations silenced or 
misconstrued the narrative of the Sahrawi people. Between those who represented the 
Sahrawi struggle as a pursuit of Western-style liberal democracy, human rights and self-
determination within the nation-state system and those who represented them as potential 
terrorists, the local specificity of the needs, desires and modes of life of the Sahrawi people 
were rendered invisible.  The attempts to script the Sahrawi people within these differing 
narratives left little room for them to express their own narratives or to be recognized as 
having identities outside the U.S. geopolitical lenses and policy imperatives. We turn next to 
the human rights reports produced by the U.S. State Department on the situation in the 
Western Sahara to look for more nuanced representations of the Western Sahara conflict. 
While the State Department human rights reports on the region were less polemic than 
congressional commentary, they too impose certain narratives of the conflict and the people 
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and obscure other understandings. The reports demonstrate the evolution of the 
representations of this conflict, which both complicate the Congressional representations 
and offer their own limited and problematic representations.  
 
Human Rights Reports 
The State Department Human Rights Reports present an opportunity for the United 
States to transcend its statist bias to address the abuses suffered by individuals and groups 
targeted by the Moroccan state. The human rights reports do criticize Morocco, but they 
also mimic the Moroccan narrative of events in the region. The shifts in the language of the 
Human Rights Reports released by the State Department regarding Western Sahara are 
helpful for looking at changes in the way that representations of the region were imagined 
and contested over time. The human rights reports during the period from 2001 to 2013 
reflect the rise in civil society organizing in the Moroccan-occupied territory, and the 
increased repression that accompanied it.  The reports continue to use the same basic 
template, but small changes in the wording and reports of specific events reflect shifting 
discourses around this region.   
From 2000 until 2004, the opening sentence of the Country Report for Western 
Sahara read: “Morocco claims the Western Sahara and administers Moroccan law and 
regulation in the approximately 85 percent of the territory which it controls; however, 
sovereignty remains disputed between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front  
. . . an organization seeking independence for the region.”167 However, in 2004 the sentence 
was revised to identify Polisario as “an organization seeking a U.N.-supervised referendum on self-
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determination for the territory.” (emphasis added ).168 This change in the language indicates a shift 
away from the independence as a possible outcome of the referendum. It is possible that the 
change reflects a sense of the failure of the Baker Plan in 2004, and the shift towards a 
negotiated political solution to the conflict that did not allow the possibility of independence. 
The following year however, the sentence was changed again to reincorporate the 
word independence and to add the population figure for the territory, “Morocco claims the 
Western Sahara territory, with a population of approximately 267 thousand, and administers 
Moroccan law and regulation in the approximately 85 percent of the territory it controls; 
however, Morocco and the Polisario Front…an organization seeking independence for the region, 
dispute its sovereignty.”169 The borders of what constituted the ‘Western Sahara territory’ are 
left ambiguous in this description, and it is unclear if the population number refers to the 
people in the Western Sahara territory within or beyond the current bounds of Moroccan 
control. Over the next several years, the human rights reports over the next several years 
update this population figure, which rose in 2007 to 383,000.  
 In 2009 the opening sentence changed again, indicating several important sites of 
contestation.  The report now read: “Morocco claims the Western Sahara territory and 
administers Moroccan law through Moroccan institutions in the estimated 85 percent of the 
territory it controls. However, Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), an organization that has sought independence for 
the formerly Spanish territory since 1973, disputes Morocco's sovereignty. The population of the 
territory was approximately 405,000, an estimated 100,000 of whom were attributable to Moroccan in-
migration.” (my emphasis).170 The past tense of the description of the Polisario’s goal of 
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independence signifies a shift away from the possibility of independence. This language 
reflects the change in state policy, as the United States repeatedly affirmed its support for the 
Moroccan Autonomy plan beginning in 2007. The revised introduction also makes note of 
the Moroccan role in producing the rising population through the use of economic 
incentives for settlers from Morocco proper.   
Other changes in the human rights reports in this period reflect complications to the 
securitizing narrative expressed by policymakers. The reports note that prevailing view of the 
national human rights council set up by the Moroccan government at the beginning of the 
decade as flawed, biased, administratively slow and inadequately independent from the 
government. The Council Nationale de Droits de L’Homme (CNDH) initiated a flawed and 
criticized Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) in 2003 to make reparations for 
human rights abuses committed under King Hassan II. The IER held public commission 
hearings in Morocco in beginning in 2005, but, according to the human rights report that 
year, the hearings planned for the Western Sahara territory were not held “due to internal 
IER time constraints compounded by demonstrations in the territory.”171 According to 
Sahrawi human rights defenders, alternative hearings were organized by Saharawi civil 
society groups to reflect the frustration against their exclusion from the national process.172 
The year 2005 saw large-scale civil society protests, termed a nonviolent intifada by Sahrawi 
human rights defenders, accompanied by brutal repression from the Moroccan security 
forces.173 
Another significant change in the human rights reports during this period was the 
de-centering of statements about the economic development achieved by Morocco in the 
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Sahara. Where previously the opening paragraph commented on the economic development 
achieved by Morocco in the region, by 2004, this comment had moved to much later in the 
document and now read, “The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic 
development program in the Western Sahara as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen 
Moroccan claims to the territory, although incomes and standards of living are substantially 
below Moroccan levels.”174 These subtle additions to the report serve as pushback against 
the narrative promoted elsewhere of Morocco’s modernization and development of the 
region (efforts which benefit the Moroccan government and settlers, but do little for the 
marginalized Sahrawi people).  
A useful measure of the pro-Moroccan bias of the reports is the treatment of the 
tent camp protest known as Gdeim Izik that ended in violence in November 2010. There are 
two glaring discrepancies between the State Department’s narrative of events and the 
narrative that emerged out of my research on the events of Gdeim Izik. First, the State 
Department seems to accept the Moroccan line that the killing of 14-year-old Nayem Elghari 
at a checkpoint outside the camp occurred because “known criminals were riding in the 
vehicle and that they fired on the gendarmes who had attempted to detain them.”175  
However, as reported by Amnesty International, the brother of the boy who was killed 
testified that they and several other boys were bringing supplies to their families living in the 
camp and that the authorities opened fire on the unarmed boys at the police checkpoint set 
up around the perimeter of the camp.176 The intense restriction for media access to the 
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region contributed to the conflicting narratives of the events of Gdeim Izik, a situation 
which one human rights group termed a “war of rumors.”177  
 The other glaring difference in the narration by the State Department is the assertion 
that “after negotiations between Interior Ministry officials and camp organizers failed to 
result in a peaceful dismantling of the camp, authorities moved on November 8 to dismantle 
it using water cannons and truncheons.”178 The Moroccan narrative of events asserts that 
Polisario had infiltrated the camp and held the participants hostage, a narrative repudiated by 
participants.179 As I have written elsewhere, the negotiations were still underway and 
compromises were being made at the time the Moroccan security forces conducted their 
surprise attack on the camp on the morning of November 8, 2010.180   
The State Department human rights reports do not mention the fact that the U.N. 
mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) is the only peacekeeping mission that does not 
have a mandate to monitor human rights abuses. Human rights organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice 
and Human Rights actively lobby the United States and the United Nations to include a 
human rights monitoring mechanism in the MINURSO mandate, which is renewed in April 
each year. In 2013, the United States introduced a proposal for a human rights monitoring 
mechanism to the draft of the mandate under discussion among the Group of Friends of 
Western Sahara before the Security Council votes on the mandate. This small step forward 
resulted in backlash from Morocco, who cancelled the annual African Lion joint-military 
exercises with the U.S. troops. Under pressure from France and Morocco, the U.S. withdrew 
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the proposal, and the MINURSO mandate was again approved without the human rights 
monitoring mechanism. Large-scale protests in the Moroccan-occupied territory in response 
to this move resulted in brutal repression from the Moroccan government.181 In this case, as 
in many others, the U.S. sacrificed its commitment to promote human rights in favor of 
retaining its political and military relationships.   
 
U.S. involvement in the Sahara-Sahel 
 The political and military relationships between the United States and Morocco were 
greatly strengthened over the course of the last decade by several complementary initiatives. 
In 2002, the U.S./Morocco Defense Consultative Committee was established, a preliminary 
step towards an enhanced military partnership that grew closer over the course of the 
decade.182 Despite the fact that terrorists of Moroccan origin participated in the September 
11 attacks, Morocco succeeded in asserting itself as a U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. The 
2003 bombing of the Casablanca train station helped to cement Morocco’s status as a fellow 
target, rather than source, of terrorism. Morocco was eager to represent itself to the United 
States as a ‘moderate Islamic ally,’ a characterization continually referenced by U.S. 
policymakers. Morocco was designated as a major non-NATO ally in 2004, giving it unique 
status as a strong partner in counterterrorism efforts. Moroccan efforts to represent the 
Polisario as a terrorist group and the Polisario-controlled refugee camps as sites of Al-Qaeda 
recruitment contributed to its self-representation as a fellow target of terrorism, and fueled 
the scripting of the Western Sahara within a volatile region of potential terrorism.   
 While the focus of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ remained on Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
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to an extent Pakistan, U.S. policymakers did not limit their concern about al-Qaeda-style 
terrorism to central Asia. A Joint Chiefs of Staff statement from 2004 asserted that ‘‘There 
exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the 
Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds 
for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, 
protecting them from surveillance and attack.’’183 Policymakers were concerned about the 
spread of terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region and speculation about the possibility of 
terrorist activity emerging from the Western Sahara became a central theme in the 
congressional hearings.  
In 2002, the State Department initiated a program known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative.  
The stated goals of the Pan-Sahel Initiative were to wage the war on terrorism and develop 
regional peace and security in Africa.  The program, which focused on Mali, Niger, 
Mauritania and Chad, aimed to develop military and political partnerships to “protect 
borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation 
and stability.”184  Congressional leaders, defense experts brought in for testimony, and media 
voices criticized the PSI for not addressing the underlying economic issues of the region and 
for producing “enemies where none were before.”185  In 2007, the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership replaced and expanded the PSI in order to address some of 
the concerns. A partnership between the State Department, USAID and the Defense 
Department enabled the TSCTP to present itself as addressing the three ‘D’s of diplomacy, 
development and defense.   
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The triad of diplomacy, development and defense formed the new face of American 
power in the Sahara-Sahel region. Policymakers were conscious of the fact that traditional 
power, specifically the use or threat of military force, was not appropriate in the context of 
this turbulent region. Rather, the United States186 sought to exert its power through low-
profile partnerships and a development “face.” The State Department officials who testified 
before the 2009 hearing on counterterrorism in the Sahel emphasized the fact that the role 
of the United States in this sensitive region must be quieter and less visible. Daniel Benjamin 
of the State Department Counterterrorism Bureau was clear about this reasoning in his 
testimony: “We have been, if you will, leading from the side. These partners have shown the 
will to take on terrorists in the past, and we expect that that will continue…These countries 
have made it clear that they do not want the United States to take a more direct or visible 
operational role, but welcome assistance from the United States and other third 
countries.”187 After a decade of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems that U.S. 
officials have realized the need to intervene in more surreptitious and low-profile ways. 
Policymakers were explicitly aware of the nature of the TSCTP as a multidimensional form 
of exerting power in this region. Senator Isakson called it “soft power,” a concept developed 
by international relations scholar Joseph Nye to describe the exertion of a form of power 
that attracts participation and support rather than coercion and force.   
Despite the low-profile approach, the TSCTP and the engagement of AFRICOM in 
the region constituted a new exertion of US military, economic, and diplomatic power in the 
region. Experts who testified in Congressional hearings recognized the possible resentment 
that the new military partnerships might cause. Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, a West Point 
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counterterrorism expert and RAND corporation researcher who testified in a 2009 hearing, 
asserted the need to put a “U.S. face on development activities” in order to “contribute to a 
reduction of anti-American sentiment” through programs such as USAID and the Peace 
Corps.  She testified that the TSCTP signified a shift away from limited peacekeeping 
operations to more offensive military capabilities. Slowly and quietly, the U.S. military has 
expanded its power in the Sahara-Sahel region, a development that represents an imperial 
form of control over the region.  
 Jacob Mundy points out that the map of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership conveniently skirts around the disputed Western Sahara, while touching every 
other country in the region.188 The scope of the TSCTP does, however, include the region of 
Algeria where the Polisario-run refugee camps are located. These camps have become sites 
of suspicion as potential terrorist ‘safe havens’ and recruiting grounds. Full of disaffected 
and frustrated young men who may be susceptible to terrorism, the Tindouf camps have 
been scripted as site of threat for the United States. Until 2011, the speculative rhetoric 
about terrorists in the Sahara and threats to the United States was just that, speculative. 189  
However, in 2011 three aid workers were kidnapped from the Polisario camps in Tindouf, 
Algeria. The alleged AQIM kidnapping of three aid workers in the camps has helped to 
promulgate the narrative of insecurity in the region.  An Aljazeera article reporting on the 
incident asserts “AQIM has not been known to target the camps for Western Sahara 
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refugees in the past. The attack goes against Moroccan suggestions that AQIM and the 
Polisario work together to target Moroccan interests.” 190 Despite the fact that Polisario 
reported the AQIM infiltration of the camps, the incident has provided fuel for the narrative 
that Polisario is working in partnership with AQIM.  
More recently, conflict in Mali has helped to propel the narrative of insecurity 
applied to the Sahara region as a whole and discussions of the conflict in Mali have 
specifically implicated the Polisario.191 In January 2012, several Tuareg groups began a 
campaign against the Malian government for independence or greater autonomy for an area 
of northern Mali known as Azawad. The civil war/rebellion that ensued involved Islamist 
groups with ties to AQIM. The Malian and Moroccan governments alleged that Polisario 
members were involved in the conflict, leading to allegations that the “problems in the 
Western Sahara are spilling over into Mali.”192 At a 2013 hearing on terrorism in the Sahel 
following the events in Benghazi, Libya, Representative Sherman turned the conversation 
towards Polisario. He stated, “I am concerned that the AQIM, the al-Qaeda and Islamic 
Maghreb, has reportedly established ties with the Polisario militants in Algeria. Algeria 
provides material support and land for the Polisario, and some of the members seem to have 
been involved in the terrorist operations in northern Mali.”193 In this statement several 
allegations of connection are made which paint a particular view of the Polisario and help to 
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delegitimize its political goals. An expert from the Washington Institute for Near East policy 
responded to this statement in the hearing noting that “it appears that there is a lot of 
rumors related to potential connections but there is no hard evidence as of now, at least 
based off the open source reporting.”194 The damage was already done; connections between 
the Polisario, AQIM and the rebellion in Mali were already circulating in the geographical 
imaginations of policymakers. 
Anthropologist Stephen Harmon’s detailed genealogy of AQIM suggests that the 
United States exaggerated the seriousness of the threat to justify its securitization initiatives 
in the region, specifically the PSI, TSCTP and AFRICOM.195 Citing a report from the 
International Crisis Group published in 2005, Harmon, Mundy, and others have suggested 
that the actual threat posed by AQIM to Western interests is quite limited.196 Jacob Mundy 
situates this exaggeration of the terrorist threat in the Sahara-Sahel in the context of the 
securitization and militarization of the region. Drawing on the concerns of securitization 
theory, he worries about the effect of security discourse on the militarization of development 
discourse and practice. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, with its goals of 
diplomacy, development and defense, is the primary example of the merging of military 
security with human security and promoting development through militarization.   
 Anthropologist Konstantina Isidoros sees these allegations of Polisario’s connection 
with terrorism in the Sahara as part of the production of Orientalist and militarist discourses 
that have been transplanted onto the Saharan context. She asserts that the refusal of the 
Polisario, and the Saharawi population, to give up on their nationalist claims has prompted 
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the US to “reconstruct them into terrorists and weave another story of fear about al-Qaeda 
conveniently popping up like a jack-in-the-box in the Sahara.”197 The terrorism script 
imposed onto the Sahara enables the United States to delegitimize the actions of the 
Polisario and the Sahrawi people while presenting itself as a legitimate state actor with 
interests that justify its militarization of the region. As Isidoros claims, it is “in the U.S. 
interest to script-write a mythology of terror onto a Saharan landscape.”198 As she and others 
have suggested, the U.S. desire to securitize this region is connected to the protection of 
economic interests of the United States, which range from specific investments, the potential 
for oil discovery off the coast of Western Sahara and the broader interest in economic 
integration and open borders to the flow of capital.   
The scripting of insecurity onto place in the geographical imaginations of 
policymakers has a dual effect on the Western Sahara and the broader Sahara-Sahel region. 
The use of discourses of security in discussions of the Western Sahara conflict is 
simultaneously symptomatic and productive of the policymakers conceptions of the Sahara-
Sahel region.  Describing the Western Sahara as a place of potential danger reinforces and 
contributes to fears about the potential dangers lurking in the vast (empty) Sahara region.  
Concomitantly, events that occur elsewhere in the Sahara-Sahel have sometimes implicated 
the Western Sahara, and have contributed to perceptions of the conflict. The geopolitical 
gaze colored by the lens of terrorism through which policymakers saw the Western Sahara 
scripted it as a site that needed to be secured by performances of U.S. power.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The geographical imaginations of American statemakers have had a profoundly 
impact on the conflict over the Western Sahara. Over the duration of this conflict, the shape 
and structure of global politics changed in some significant ways, and remained consistent in 
others. While historical events made possible, and often demanded, new geographical 
imaginaries, the geopolitical gazes that U.S. policymakers used to spatialize, order, and know 
the world reveal continuities in the hegemonic, expansionist and imperialist practices of U.S. 
policymaking. The introduction, contestation and reiteration of modes of exercising power 
and practices of naming, locating and representing places and peoples can be seen in the 
relationship of the United States to the forty years of conflict over the Western Sahara.  
Discourses of security were central, though not the only, sets of practices that made 
possible neo-imperial performances of American power. U.S. foreign policymakers 
performed the state through the process of naming, representing and mapping the Western 
Sahara conflict. This thesis project sought to identify how and why certain discourses on this 
region gained political currency and how they foreclosed other ways of seeing, and thus 
crafting policy toward, the Western Sahara conflict. What has remained consistent across 
various historicized narratives was the representation of Western Sahara as a site that needed 
to be secured. This theme is characteristic of the imperial state’s imperative to expand its 
power by policing the periphery.  
The process of statemaking requires a relentlessly constant iteration of discourses of 
power, security and sovereignty, which shape the meaning and identity of the state as an 
effect of this performance. The process of scripting the Western Sahara region reveals this 
constant struggle to assert meaning within U.S. policymaking circles, a process that produced 
real material effects on the lives of people in the region. The scripting of the Western Sahara 
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region as a place of potential danger created the conditions of possibility for exertions of 
U.S. power in the broader Sahara-Sahel region through programs such as the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership and AFRICOM. Throughout this performance of statecraft 
there were moments of possibility when the narratives were contested, when individual 
voices dissented from the securitization of the region, and when alternative ways of 
representing the region were foreclosed by discourses of security.  
The first of such moments was the period during the Carter administration when the 
U.S. placed tight restrictions against sales of arms to Morocco that might be used in the 
Western Sahara war. This moment of opportunity for change was foreclosed when the 
combined pressures of the collapse of friendly regimes in Iran and Nicaragua prompted U.S. 
policymakers to return to a policy of providing unrestricted security assistance to political 
friends. The second, and perhaps most significant moment of opportunity to reconsider 
policy toward this conflict was the period in the early 1990s when the Cold War ended, the 
ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario was implemented, and the UN initiated the 
referendum process. This period, which shook up the international order, provided an 
opportunity to challenge existing political approaches and develop new foreign policies. 
Traditional concepts of political power, and state-centric ideas of sovereignty, self-
determination and security could have been fundamentally reimagined during this period. 
However, hegemonic practices to secure the Western Sahara, justified through discourses of 
security (as well as U.S.-centric discourses of democracy promotion and free trade), only 
accelerated during this period.  
The ‘War on Terror’ that emerged in the wake of the events of 9/11 called into being 
securitization measures both reminiscent of, and different from, securitization in the Cold 
War era. The scripting of the Western Sahara region as a site of potential threat produced the 
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conditions of possibility for the rise of U.S. military activity in the Sahara region. The 
creation of AFRICOM and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism partnership demonstrate a 
new fusion of American military, political, and economic power in North Africa. The quiet 
construction of a drone base in Niger from which to survey and police the Sahara-Sahel 
region is one example of this new exertion of U.S. power. 199 This use of diffuse and 
multifaceted power is part of a larger imperial project of expanding American power in 
North Africa.  
The logic of the imperial state requires the subjection of marginal spaces in the 
periphery to securitization and control. The United States supports Morocco’s 
administration of the territory and seeks to legitimize it by supporting the Moroccan 
autonomy plan for the Western Sahara. This serves both the interests of the Moroccan state 
and that of the United States. The autonomy plan would legalize Morocco’s control over the 
disputed territory, a victory for Moroccan nationalism and state power. It would open up the 
territory to further exploitation of resources without legal constraints and would enable the 
U.S. to expand its new military and development initiatives into the region. These initiatives 
indicate that it is no longer enough for the U.S. to rely on proxy states to secure this region, 
                                                
199 The drone is a powerful symbol of the United State’ exercise of modern imperial power, as well as the 
possessive and destructive capacity of the geopolitical gaze. It is likely that drone technology will be used in the 
next 10 years, either by Morocco or the United States directly, to secure and police the Western Sahara 
territory. Currently, a large majority of the mostly clandestine drone attacks take place in Waziristan, a 
‘Federally Administered Tribal Area.’ The Western Sahara territory bears interesting parallels to this region of 
Pakistan in the imaginary geographies of policymakers. Like Waziristan, the Western Sahara is a non-self-
governing, federally (or colonially) administered territory inhabited by traditionally nomadic tribes. Both regions 
are subjected to a statist disavowal of indigenous rights to self-determination and political legitimacy. Those 
characteristics contribute to the rationalization of drone attacks in Waziristan, which coud conceivably translate 
to the Western Sahara case. The geopolitical gaze produces the rhetoric of drones as ‘surgical,’ ‘precise,’ and 
‘targeted,’ terms that erase and disguise the violence of drone attacks. The United States, via AFRICOM, is 
currently building a drone base in Niger from which to fight the war on terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region 
(see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/drone-base-in-niger-gives-us-a-strategic-
foothold-in-west-africa/2013/03/21/700ee8d0-9170-11e2-9c4d-798c073d7ec8_story.html and see Nick Turse 
on the U.S. covert war budding in Africa: http://www.thenation.com/article/179324/us-military-has-been-
war-africa-sly-years). Morocco has already begun to buy drones from Israel and France (see: 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/9356-morocco-buys-israeli-designed-weapons).  
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but that direct U.S. military involvement is considered necessary to sustain hegemonic 
stability over this region in accordance with U.S. interests.  
Why is there a need or desire to secure this territory? Several conventional foreign 
policy imperatives overlap to create this perception. In economic terms, the Western Sahara 
is a site of potential resource extraction, in military terms it is strategically located to serve 
the ongoing war against terrorism, and in political terms it expands the U.S. sphere of 
influence. Beyond these perceptions of interest, securitization is an imperative of the 
spatializing practices of the imperial state. As a modern imperial state, the discursive and 
material practices of the U.S. map space into territories to be controlled and secured, either 
directly and indirectly by imperial or neo-imperial practices. As we have seen however, the 
logics of the state are vulnerable and contestable. They can be challenged by practices of 
resistance within the territory, in the debates between policymakers, at the level of the 
Security Council, and by new representations and alternative modes of narration that 
intervene in prevailing discourses. 
In the most recent congressional hearing on U.S. policy toward Morocco, which 
took place on April 9, 2014, we can see recurring themes as well as glimmers of resistance 
that suggest the possibility of challenging the hegemonic securitization of the region. 200 The 
majority of congressional leaders in this hearing performed a pro-Morocco script. Led by 
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a long-time friend of Morocco, the congressional 
speakers emphasized Morocco’s status as a strong partner and U.S. ally. The language of U.S. 
responsibility, the references to interest and the drive to secure and securitize the region, as 
well as the acknowledgment that the new trade relationship was more far more beneficial to 
                                                
200 United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
North Africa. Hearing on U.S. Policy towards Morocco. One-hundred and thirteenth Congress. April 9, 2014. 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-us-policy-towards-morocco  
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the U.S. than to Morocco, revealed that the nature of the relationship was less than 
‘bilateral,’ and carried undertones of paternalism and neo-imperialism. Policymakers 
emphasized the ‘potential’ for extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism and terrorism. They 
brought up concerns over vulnerability and porous borders, and identified the ‘empty’ and 
‘open’ space as a vague danger to U.S. interests.  
William Roebuck, the official representing the State Department, however, resisted 
Congressional attempts to quantify and characterize the threat posed by Polisario. When 
asked about concerns that the Western Sahara was becoming a breeding ground for 
terrorists, he asserted that, to his knowledge, there is no significant terrorist activity in the 
region and no firm links between the Polisario and AQIM. Yet, while he refused to embrace 
this terrorist characterization as state policy, he did not challenge the idea that the space of 
the Western Sahara was empty and needed to be secured. He noted, “Our general 
assessment of the WS is as follows: It is a large space, we don’t think that it is good for a 
space that big to be an ungoverned space, that’s why we support the UN being there.” 
Ungoverned, or empty space, which is seen to defy modern norms of territoriality and 
sovereignty, is perceived as dangerous to the modern state and thus requires securitization 
and control, exerted either directly or indirectly.  
In the face of Congressional pressure to embrace the Moroccan Autonomy Plan as 
the only possible solution to the conflict, Roebuck called it ‘serious’ and ‘credible,’ but only a 
potential approach, leaving room for other possibilities. So while these congressional leaders 
(many of whom are members of the Congressional Morocco Caucus) are firm in their 
support for Morocco’s legitimization of its occupation through a negotiated autonomy 
agreement, the State Department (or at least this official) seems to have not yet foreclosed all 
other options. However, the U.S. continues to exert inordinate power over the region. 
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Indeed, Roebuck was clear on the fact that the State Department understands itself to have 
the power to decide the fate of this region, even if they do not choose to exert it. 
Congressman Connolly asked Roebuck, “What is wrong with the US saying (in our humble 
opinion) that the Western Sahara would never be able to exist as a sovereign state viably? 
Why can’t we make that decision?” Roebuck’s response was to say, “I suppose we could, but 
we haven’t.” He did not challenge the assumption that the United States does and should 
have the power to decide the fate of other peoples who are owed the right to self-
determination. He simply said that it has not, yet, been the U.S. policy to do so in this case. 
For the Sahrawi people, for international principles of law and human rights, for democracy, 
and for political subjects, there is a lot ‘wrong’ with that imperial assumption of power.  
Absent from the entire hearing was an acknowledgement of the right to choose 
Sahrawi independence. The possibility that a referendum for self-determination that would 
include the possibility for independence would take place seems to be entirely off the table. 
Also absent from the hearing was a discussion of the possibility of giving the MINURSO 
peacekeeping mission the power to monitor human rights when its mandate is renewed at 
the end of April 2014, a long contested demand of Sahrawis in the occupied territory and 
international human rights organizations.201 Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen was the only one to 
mention the ongoing issue of human rights violations. In the context of praising Morocco’s 
weak democratic reforms, she simply noted, “when it comes to human rights, certainly more 
can be done.” Of course, this is far from condemning the arbitrary arrests, brutal repression 
                                                
201 The vote to renew the MINURSO mandate was supposed to take place April 23rd, but was postponed until 
next week to give the countries time to review the draft mandate proposed by the United States. In 2013 the 
U.S. included the long-demanded human rights monitoring mechanism in the draft, but withdrew it under 
pressure from Morocco and France. This year, the draft calls on both parties to respect human rights, but does 
not include a mandate to monitor violations. The annual renewal of the MINURSO mandate presents an 
opportunity to make this small improvement in daily life for the Sahrawi people, but has been repeatedly 
foreclosed. The U.S. bows to Moroccan pressure in order to maintain their beneficial relationship, seen in the 
reconciliatory joint statement issued by President Obama and King Mohammed IV in November 2013.  
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of nonviolent demonstrations, constant police surveillance, educational and economic 
discrimination, corrupt justice system, and lack of free speech that plague the occupied 
territory. More can be done, certainly. Though I am wary of promoting any further 
intervention of the United States in this region, the first steps would be to authorize human 
rights monitoring in the MINURSO mandate, and to use the leverage of the U.S. to pressure 
Morocco into complying with the referendum process. Instead of advocating these steps, 
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen’s comment falls into an all-to-common pattern of paying 
rhetorical tribute to human rights discourse without any intention of follow-through. 
The rhetoric of the last several decades, particularly the Carter and Clinton 
administrations, has sought to brand the United States as a democracy-loving, freedom-
seeking, and human rights-protecting global superpower. The discursive commitment to 
these values and principles enabled the United States to represent itself as a hegemonic, yet 
benevolent global power. The discourses of rights and freedoms contribute to the U.S. 
concept of its self, while the discourse of security is deployed to delimit who is, and who is 
not, deserving of protection and rights. This process privileges the rights of those deemed 
‘Americans’ over other peoples who seek rights, freedoms, and security. Seen through this 
geopolitical gaze, the needs and desires of a small, nomadic, Muslim, Arab population on the 
edge of the Sahara are consistently excluded and erased.    
Overshadowed by the geopolitical power posturing and securitization of the region 
are people whose voices, political agency and identities are being silenced. The process of 
securitizing the Sahara excludes Sahrawis from the category of people deserving of 
protection, and instead made them potential enemies undeserving of the basic human right 
to collective self-determination. This effect of the discourse of policymakers obfuscated and 
devalued the histories, identities and narratives of the Sahrawi people. However, in recent 
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years, several civil society organizations have emerged in both the occupied territory and the 
refugee camps to give voice to these narratives. Large-scale, sustained, nonviolent protests 
occurred in 1999, 2005 and 2010, while small protests occur daily in the cities of the 
occupied territory. Access to the Internet has provided an outlet for Sahrawi voices through 
innumerable blogs, photos and Youtube videos that document Moroccan repression and 
human rights abuses. Strong civil society leaders have emerged in the territory, including 
Aminatou Haidar, a human rights activist and former political prisoner, whose 2009 hunger 
strike garnered international attention. Haidar’s organization, Collective of Sahrawi Human 
Rights Defenders (CODESA) and the Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights 
Abuses (ASVDH) are both active in organizing demonstrations and monitoring and 
reporting ongoing human rights abuses. ASVDH vice president, Elghalia Djimi, is building a 
community of politically active young women, many of whom have already been imprisoned 
for their human rights and pro-independence activism. The work of people like Aminatou 
and Elghalia, events like the Gdeim Izik encampment, and the constant protests in the 
streets of Western Saharan cities demonstrate the existence of a vibrant civil society of 
Sahrawis striving for political independence and validation after nearly a century and a half 
of successive colonizations.202 
 The consequences of ignoring these alternative narratives come home to define the 
American citizen-subject. Reading the discourses of policymakers as performative practices 
of the state is necessary in order to understand how we (all) are interpellated as subjects 
within these discourses. Washington’s view of the Western Sahara is important not only 
because of the violence that the geopolitical gaze has allowed and encouraged against the 
Saharawi people, but also because of what this process of scripting the Western Sahara says 
                                                
202 Dann, Naomi. “Nonviolent Resistance in the Western Sahara.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice. Vol. 26 
(March 2014): 46-53.  
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about statemakers and us as citizens of an imperial state. Our political identities and self-
knowledges are subject to discourses of security and the performances of the state. Security 
discourses shape the way we receive and understand experiences, how we conceive of other 
places and peoples, and enable the state to exert ever more intrusive practices of power and 
securitization abroad and at home.  
The discourses of security reach deep into domestic political life, producing a culture 
of fear that former National Security Adviser to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has 
called a “self-inflicted wound.” 203 For Brzezinski, the culture of fear undermines American 
democracy, America’s psyche and U.S. standing in the world. The culture of fear and the 
discourses of security help to produce and maintain a state of emergency, a mode of politics 
that gives the state nearly unlimited power. As Walter Benjamin writes, the state of 
emergency has become the norm, rather than an exception. As citizens of an imperial power 
governed by discourses of security, we are constantly subject to the sovereign power of a 
state operating under the logics of exclusion and exception. We participate in and reproduce 
the discourses of exclusion and exception regularly, helping to perform state power that we 
too are subject to and policed by. These discourses trap us within violent, exclusive and 
othering practices of representation and violent cartographies through which we categorize, 
interpellate and fix the identities of other places and peoples.  
Michael Shapiro describes geographic processes of mapping otherness and danger as 
violent cartographies that produce ‘architectures of enmity.’ He posits that “Geography is 
inextricably linked to the architecture of enmity” because it is centrally implicated “in how 
territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they 
                                                
203 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Terrorized by ‘war on Terror’: How a Three-Word Mantra has Undermined 
America." The Washington Post 25, (2007). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301613.html  
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practice the meanings of the Self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for 
regarding others as threats or antagonists.”204 Not only policymakers, but the people 
themselves, American citizens in this case, are shaped by geographic imaginations of 
security, power and danger that map otherness as threatening. As Derek Gregory notes, 
“these imaginative geographies lodge many more of us in the same architectures of enmity. 
It is important not to allow the spectacular violence of September 11, or the wars in 
Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, to blind us to the banality of the colonial present and to our 
complicity in its horrors.”205 The conflict over the Western Sahara is not spectacular, for the 
most part it is invisible to most Americans. This invisibility and erasability renders its 
colonial present and the struggles of the people affected all the more banal. As citizen-
subjects of an imperial power, we are complicit in this colonial present, and have power to 
change its practices and realities.  
The moments of contestation and resistance to imperial/geopolitical practices of 
representation revealed in this project are meant to demonstrate the incoherence and the 
vulnerability of the state. The practices and discourses that constitute the state must be 
constantly reiterated and performed to sustain its power. The foreclosures of alternative 
representations and ways of seeing the Western Sahara were not permanent, but had to be 
sustained by securitizing discourses. Gregory posits that the scripting of performances of 
power does not make outcomes fully determined, but instead provides a space for possible 
intervention and change.206 This project has focused on places were the state discourse on 
the Western Sahara was vulnerable to change, and where alternatives were foreclosed. These 
foreclosures, often justified by discourses of security lead me to wonder whether the concept 
                                                
204 Shapiro, Michael. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997): xi.  
205 Gregory, Derek. The Colonial Present. (Malden: MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 16. 
206 Gregory, 19. 
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of security can be reimagined to allow for more just practices of foreign policy and resistance 
to the violent practices of the imperial state. 
To escape repeating and reiterating violent practices, we must begin to think 
alternative theories of security. Security has long been understood as a zero-sum game, in 
which one group’s insecurity produces the conditions of possibility for another’s security. 
Only when we can begin to think and practice alternative securities that are not predicated 
on the insecurity of others, can we begin to move towards just resolutions of conflict and 
frameworks for cohabitation. This paradigm shift requires new practices of representation, 
and new modes of relating to otherness.  
Judith Butler’s work in Precarious Lives (2006) and Frames of War (2009) can help us to 
begin to work out possibilities for thinking differently. Her work Frames of War, is concerned 
with the political and moral implications of the frames or lenses through which we 
apprehend, or fail to apprehend, certain lives, characterized by their precarity, as grievable. 207 
Butler’s idea that policy must understand the precariousness of life as a shared condition 
suggests a path for rethinking security by recognizing and embracing shared vulnerability. 
She writes, “the subject that I am is bound to is the subject I am not, that we each have the 
power to destroy and to be destroyed, and that we are bound to one another in this power 
and this precariousness. In this sense, we are all precarious lives.”208 A radically new 
conceptualization of security on the basis of shared vulnerability provides jumping off point 
for continued investigation into new possibilities for performing security in the context of 
foreign policy and statemaking.209 
                                                
207 Butler differentiates between precariousness and precarity of life to emphasize the politically induced nature 
of precarity and the vulnerability to state power that it produces.  
208 Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is life grievable? (New York: Verso, 2009): 43. 
209 What might anti-imperial or anti-national security look like? An avenue to explore further.  
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Looking forward, there are many routes for further investigation into the concepts 
and relationships explored in this thesis project.210 In order to theorize new modes of 
performing security with the goal of practicing a more just foreign policy, there are two 
directions that need further development. First, types of security and types of threats need to 
be differentiated, and their specific practices examined. How is imperial security different 
from national security? Have the practices of security moved from spatial containment to 
spatial administration?211 What does that look like, either in spaces like the Western Sahara or 
in inner-city neighborhoods? Can we imagine a security based on the idea of shared 
vulnerability? Security without violence? And second, more work is needed on the 
relationship between the principle of self-determination and territorial sovereignty. What 
kind of threat does self-determination pose to the territorial integrity of the modern state? 
What is the relationship between sovereignty and security? Can true self-determination be 
realized outside of the confines of the statist imaginary? What could multiple overlapping 
sovereignties look like? How could reconceptualizing sovereignty lead to cohabitation and 
conflict resolution? Asking and attempting to answer these questions can help to deconstruct 
violent cartographies of peoples and places, and to begin to imagine new ways of living that 
are more peaceful and more just.  
 
                                                
210 The process of researching, thinking and reading about the ideas and events explored in this thesis project 
has been extremely challenging and rewarding. The project evolved significantly, starting from a political 
interest in the Western Sahara conflict and turning towards U.S. foreign policy as a site where I, as an American 
citizen, felt a sense of responsibility and could conceive of possibilities for change. During the research process, 
I was attracted to a (new-to-me) body of thought that I struggled to articulate with respect to my case study. It 
often felt that one or the other (theory or research) was getting lost or left behind. My biggest struggles have 
been to narrow down thoughts, to string ideas together in a sequence that a reader can follow, and to write 
concisely.  
211 As Katharyne Mitchell suggests in “Ungoverned Space: Global security and the geopolitics of broken 
windows.” Political Geography 01/2010; 29(5):289-297.  !
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Appendix: 
Maps of the Western Sahara region 
 
Figure 1. CIA World Factbook map of the Western Sahara in the context of the African continent212 
 
Note: The CIA World Factbook includes the Western Sahara in their dropdown list of countries, but notes that 
its sovereignty is unresolved.  
 
Figure 2. Maps of Morocco 
CIA World Factbook map of Morocco213 Moroccan government map of Morocco214 
  
Note: The Western Sahara is not delimited as a separate territory in the map produced by the Moroccan 
government. It is illegal to produce maps in Morocco that show delineate the separation between the 
“Southern Provinces” and Morocco ‘proper.’ 
                                                
212 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Map of Western Sahara. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html  
213 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Map of Morocco. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html 
214 Royaume du Maroc. Carte du Maroc. https://www.maroc.ma/fr/content/carte-du-maroc. 
Figure 3. United Nations Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) map215  
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Note: See the delineation of the berm (in red), and the location of the Tindouf refugee camps.  
 
 
                                                
215 United Nations. MINURSO. Map no. 3691 Rev. 73. Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section. April 2014. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minurso.pdf  
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Figure 4. Counterterrorism in the Sahel 
New Terrorism Hot Spot: N. Mali & Africa’s Sahel216 
 
 
Note: The arrow of the Arc of Instability points directly at the Western Sahara, and intersects an arrow 
denoting drug trade that reaches to the United States. This map was posted on the blog Morocco On The 
Move, a Moroccan government propaganda blog.  
 
The Pan-Sahel Initiative Map217  
 
Note: Jacob Mundy points out that the region described as terrorist conveniently touches all the relevant 
countries in the region who have control over valuable resources. As legal sovereignty over the Western Sahara 
has not been determined, this area is not visibly included in the map, but is wrapped up in a securitized region.  
 
                                                
216 Alexander, Yonah. "Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and 
Implications." International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington (February, 2013). 
217 Mundy, Jacob. "How the ‘War on Terror’ Undermined Peace in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara 
Conflict After 9/11." Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin no. 77 (2007): 1-19. 
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Figure 4. Sahara-Sahel: Movements and Routes218 
  
                                                
218 Le Monde Diplomatique, Sahara-Sahel: Movements And Routes, image, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, 
http://mondediplo.com/maps/saharasahel 
 
